Suljettujen online-mainosalustojen strategiat — tapaukset Google ja Facebook by Holkeri, Miikka
 Aalto University 
School of Science 
Degree Programme in Industrial Engineering and Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Miikka Holkeri 
 
Strategies of closed online advertising 
platforms — cases Google and Facebook 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Espoo, May 30, 2018 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Robin Gustafsson 
Instructor: Arto Tolonen, M.Sc. (Tech.)
  Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 
Author Miikka Holkeri 
Title of thesis Strategies of closed online advertising platforms — cases 
Google and Facebook 
Degree programme Industrial Engineering and Management 
Major/minor Strategy and Venturing Code   SCI3050 
Thesis supervisor Professor Robin Gustafsson 
Thesis advisor(s) Arto Tolonen, M.Sc. (Tech.) 
Date  30.5.2018 Number of pages   64 Language   English 
Abstract 
This thesis studies closed ad platforms in the modern online advertising industry. The 
research in the field is still nascent and the concept of a closed ad platform doesn’t exist. 
The objective of the research was to discover the main factors determining the revenue of 
online advertising platforms and to understand why some publishers choose to establish 
their own closed ad platforms instead of selling their inventory for third-party ad 
platforms.  
The concept of a closed ad platform is defined leveraging the existing online advertising 
literature and the platform governance structure theory. Using the case study method, 
Google and Facebook were chosen as the cases as they have driven most of the innovation 
in the field and quickly gained significant market share. In total, 47 people were 
interviewed for this study, most of them working for advanced online advertisers. Based on 
the interviews, a microeconomic mathematic formula is created for modeling an ad 
platform’s net advertising revenue. The formula is used to identify the five main drivers of 
an ad platform’s revenue an each of them are studied in depth. 
The results suggest that the most important revenue drivers the ad platforms can affect are 
access to an active user base, the efficiency of ad serving and the comprehensiveness of 
measurement. Setting up a closed ad platform requires significant investments from a 
publisher and should be only done if it can improve the advertisers’ results. After it’s been 
established, a closed platform can leverage its position to collect user data and structured 
business data to optimize its performance further. The results provide a structured 
understanding of the main dynamics in the industry that can be used in decision-making 
and a basis for future research on closed ad platforms. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tämä diplomityö tutkii suljettuja mainosalustoja nykyaikaisella online-mainonta-alalla. 
Alan tutkimus on vielä aluillaan ja suljetun mainosalustan konseptia ei ole olemassa. 
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli löytää online-mainosalustojen liikevaihdon määrittävät 
tekijät ja ymmärtää miksi jotkut julkaisijat valitsevat omien suljettujen mainosalustojen 
perustamisen mainospaikkojen kolmansien osapuolien mainosalustoille myymisen sijaan. 
Suljetun mainosalustan konsepti määritellään olemassaolevaa online-
mainontakirjallisuutta ja alustojen hallintarakenneteoriaa hyödyntäen. 
Tapaustutkimusmenetelmää käyttäen, Google ja Facebook valittiin tapauksiksi, sillä ne 
ovat ajaneet eniten innovaatioita alalla ja nopeasti saavuttaneet merkittävän 
markkinaosuuden. Yhteensä 47 henkilöä haastateltiin tätä tutkimusta varten, useimmat 
heistä edistyneiden online-mainostajien työntekijöitä. Haastattelujen perusteella luodaan 
mikrotaloudellinen matemaattinen kaava mainosalustan nettoliikevaihdon mallintamiseksi. 
Kaavaa käytetään tunnistamaan mainosalustan liikevaihdon viisi pääkomponenttia, ja 
kuhunkin niistä perehdytään syvällisemmin. 
Tulokset viittaavat, että tärkeimmät liikevaihdon ajurit, joihin mainosalustat voivat 
vaikuttaa ovat pääsy aktiiviseen käyttäjäkantaan, mainosten näyttämisen tehokkuus ja 
mittaamisen kattavuus. Suljetun mainosalustan perustaminen vaatii merkittäviä 
investointeja julkaisijalta ja tulisi tehdä ainoastaan, jos sillä voidaan parantaa mainostajien 
tuloksia. Suljetun alustan perustamisen jälkeen sen positiota voidaan hyödyntää 
käyttäjädatan ja strukturoidun liiketoimintadatan keräämiseksi suorituskyvyn edelleen 
optimoimiseksi. Tulokset tarjoavat toimialan päädynamiikkojen ymmärryksen, jota 
voidaan käyttää päätöksenteossa sekä pohjana suljettujen mainosalustojen edelleen 
tutkimiseksi tulevaisuudessa. 
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1! Introduction 
1.1! A brief history of online advertising 
1.1.1! The emergence of performance-based advertising 
 
“Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don't know which half.” 
— John Wanamaker (apocryphal) 
 
The biggest question advertisers face is whether a marketing investment is justified or not. 
Who are the people reached? What kind of effect does the campaign have on the target 
audience? How to measure the impact? 
Over time, marketers have invented various ways to measure the impact indirectly: e.g., 
measuring sales lift in a certain timeframe or geography following a campaign or surveying 
a sample to determine the increase in brand awareness. These types of measurements can 
yield rough estimates, but it’s not possible to get a conclusive answer due to the interplay of 
outside factors, including other marketing channels and the varying timeframe of the 
effects. Moreover, the methods are expensive, require large amounts of data and can’t be 
used in the middle of a campaign. 
The prices in traditional advertising—also known as offline advertising—are typically 
determined by the number of people reached with the advertisements (referred to as “ad” 
from now on): newspaper or magazine subscribers, television viewers, radio listeners, traffic 
passing a billboard and so on. To make a decision, the advertiser considers the reach and 
the type of audience associated with that channel. 
As internet penetration has grown and time spent online accounts for an increasingly 
significant share of total time spent with media, ad inventories have also moved online. 
Online advertising spending constitutes an ever-larger part of the total advertising spend 
globally (Figure 1). The growth has fueled innovation in online advertising technology, 
providing continually better results for advertisers, again increasing online ad spending. 
  9 
  
Figure 1. Global offline and online advertising spending (US $ billions at 2015 average exchange rates). Years 
2016–2020 forecast. (McKinsey & Company, 2016) 
Part of the success of online advertising comes from the fundamental difference to 
traditional advertising: the improved ability to serve customized ads individually and track 
the actions taken as a result of being exposed to them. 
Being better at tracking user actions has far-reaching implications. First, the results are used 
to justify marketing expenditures. This applies especially to digital businesses in which the 
user actions are easier to track. For example, if an e-commerce advertiser knows for sure 
that spending $10 000 in a marketing campaign yields $12 000 in incremental profits, the 
decision becomes obvious. Advertisers start to think of ad spend as part of the cost of goods 
sold (COGS) instead of a line expense. Second, the advertisers don’t have to care where 
precisely an ad is shown, as long as it provides results—except for placements 
compromising brand safety such as alongside disturbing or adult content. This type of 
advertising in which the advertiser pays based on the measurable results is called performance-
based advertising. 
Many digital services have massive amounts of data of their users that can be used to 
segment them in various ways. Also, many parties involved in ad serving can track user 
actions across web domains using browser cookies and across mobile applications using 
device identifiers. This data can be used to inform targeting. For example, an advertiser 
might want to reach 25–34-year-old women interested in swimming to deliver a specific 
message tailored for them. 
Gathering user data and tracking of user actions after an ad impression—a single ad shown 
once to a single user—can be further used with optimization based statistical data analysis. 
The value of an ad impression to a particular user can be estimated based on similar users’ 
observed probability to complete the desired action. 
293 297 302 301 305 303 309 308 316 319 330
66 77 89
105 124 148
173 198
224 249
273
359 374
391 406
429 451
482 506
540
567
602
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016F 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F
Offline Online
  10 
1.1.2! The dawn of the programmatic value chain 
The first online ads were launched in 1994 (Figure 2). They were banners on websites, 
nowadays classified as display advertising. The term encompasses banners, rich media, 
sponsorships and videos shown on third-party websites or in applications. 
 
Figure 2. AT&T's "You Will" banner ad, known as the first online ad in the world, launched on hotwired.com 
among ads from 14 companies on 27 October 1994. (Singel, 2010) 
All the first online advertising deals happened through direct sales between the advertisers 
or their agencies and the publishers owning the websites where the ads were served. While 
this is a common practice for some large publishers and advertisers still today, typically part 
of the inventory is left over. Also, as this type of operation is very cumbersome with a large 
amount of supply and demand sources, ad networks were born to aggregate the supply and 
demand by grouping impressions into segments and reselling them to advertisers. However, 
the number of ad networks started also proliferating rapidly, and the resulting system was 
complicated, inefficient and lacked transparency both for advertisers and publishers. Ad 
exchanges emerged to allow transparently facilitating ad buying and selling between various 
parties. 
Ad exchanges operate through programmatic buying: instead of placing an order for a fixed 
amount of impressions, each impression is auctioned between the advertisers in real time 
when the page is loaded—also known as real-time-bidding (RTB). Moreover, before entering 
the auction, the buyers get information about the user’s device and have the opportunity to 
see if they have previous data about the user, e.g. based on website cookies or device 
identifiers. The buyers use all this information to estimate the conversion rate (CVR)—the 
probability of a user to complete a particular desired action—and value of that conversion 
to bid accordingly for the impression. 
Supporting all the operations in RTB requires advanced infrastructure, and there are many 
steps that can be optimized with better tools, analysis or data. Thus, a value chain between 
publishers and advertisers, consisting of various kinds of specialized operators (Figure 3), 
started to form organically. 
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Figure 3. A simplified diagram of the most typical value layers involved in programmatic ad serving. 
Typically, the advertisers access the ad exchanges through specialized software called 
demand-side platforms (DSP). These are paid by the advertiser and usually include bidding 
algorithms, data integrations, attribution and reporting. Respectively, publishers use supply-
side platforms (SSP) to manage available demand sources. 
As the publishers only provide the screen estate and the advertisements are served from an 
external server, various advertiser ad serving services, paid by the advertiser, provide 
centralized storage, tracking and delivery of the assets. Publisher ad servers help publishers 
manage their ad inventory and provide reports on the ads shown. Some advanced 
publishers try to maximize their revenue by using header-bidding (not visualized) to offer their 
inventory simultaneously to multiple ad exchanges and choosing the highest bid before 
making calls to their ad servers. 
The quality of ad impressions varies from publisher to publisher due to viewability, brand 
safety and possible fraud. Pre-bid decisioning tools allow advertisers to evaluate the quality to 
influence decision-making before bidding. The advertiser typically pays for these. Verification 
tools, paid either by the advertiser or the publisher, measure the quality of delivery. 
Advertisers have the option of optimizing their bidding and delivery on user-by-user basis, 
but any single advertiser seldom has enough data about the users they want to reach. 
Various data and targeting services collect user data from diverse sources and allow advertisers 
to target specific types of users and devices. 
Data management platforms (DMP) allow both advertisers and publishers collect data from 
multiple sources in real time, enrich it with third-party data, aggregate and segment it to be 
used in multiple services. It is the “plumbing” advertisers need to access all of the other 
services. 
Although there has been some consolidation and many providers include multiple 
aforementioned services in their offering, the number of companies operating in 
programmatic ad buying is still very high. The trend seems to be to integrate multiple 
services under yet another layer. 
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The extensiveness of the programmatic value chain has adverse side effects. Each service 
takes a cut of the revenue, and the billing models are typically based on the number of 
impressions served or a percentage of the advertising spend. Online advertising interest 
group IAB estimated that in 2014, ad technology services cumulatively captured 55% of the 
programmatic revenue and the publishers only got the remaining 45%. (Interactive 
Advertising Bureau [IAB], 2015). 
1.1.3! Closed ad platforms integrate vertically 
As programmatic buying allows each ad impression to be evaluated and individually 
targeted, first-party advertiser data—e.g., the past online behavior of the user—started to 
become more valuable than publisher data—e.g., what’s on the page where the user 
currently is. Furthermore, as a side-effect of letting third parties to serve targeted 
advertisements on their websites, the publishers had to allow the third parties to collect data 
of their users constantly. This had the effect of shifting power from publishers to the 
advertisers and technology providers. 
However, some of the biggest publishers—such as Google and Facebook (Figure 4)—are 
protective of their vast amounts of user data and not willing to let third parties collect and 
monetize it. Instead, they opted for creating their own infrastructure for buying, targeting, 
serving and measuring advertisements—essentially, everything done by the various value 
layers of the programmatic value chain—on their platform. The payoffs can be high: these 
closed ad platforms (also known as “walled gardens”) don’t have to let the programmatic value 
chain capture their share of the advertising revenue, they don’t have to hand over their 
valuable user data and they can better control the user ad experience through standards 
and reviews. This solution, however, is viable only for the biggest publishers as it takes a lot 
of resources and imposes additional overhead to advertisers who desire to operate with 
them. 
  
Figure 4. Net online advertising revenues worldwide in 2015, by company (US $ billions). After traffic 
acquisition costs (TAC) to partner sites. (Liu, 2016) 
As explained in section 1.1.1, the ad revenue of a performance advertising channel is mostly 
determined by the measurable results its advertisers are getting. To provide the best 
possible results, the closed platforms offer a variety of targeting options—e.g., user 
demographics or certain types of behavior on the platform—and in some cases, automatic 
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optimization based on user-level data only accessible by the platform itself. Many of the 
options are similar to the ones provided by the data and targeting services in programmatic 
buying. 
However, the advertisers can often further improve their results by using first-party data—
typically to retarget their existing customer base or known prospects such as website visitors. 
Thus, many closed platforms allow advertisers to upload their data to the platform to be 
matched to its users. This way, instead of giving out user data, the platforms can gather 
more data while providing targeted advertising. 
1.1.4! Search engines introduce a new way to advertise 
In the early days of online advertising, search engines were facing an issue: display 
advertising was their primary revenue source, but ideally, people spend as little time on the 
search results pages as possible which makes them less likely to click the ads. In 1998, four 
years after the first display ads, GoTo.com (renamed Overture in 2001 and acquired by 
Yahoo! in 2003) introduced the first search ads: advertisers paying for web traffic based on 
users’ search phrases—called keywords (Laffey, 2007). 
Search ads are usually sponsored links displayed next to the organic—i.e., non-paid—search 
results. Their price is also typically settled in an auction: the order of the sponsored links is 
determined by how much the advertisers are willing to pay for a click from a specific 
keyword and a calculated estimate of the link’s relevance to the user. 
Search ads have been extremely successful for multiple reasons. First, search engines are a 
common tool for finding information about products and services online and indicate the 
type of potential purchase intent precisely. Consequently, the value of a single click from a 
well-defined keyword leading to a purchase can be significant to the advertiser. The 
auction-based pricing guarantees that the click prices reflect that value (Table 1).  
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Table 1. The most expensive Google Search keyword categories in 2017 (Gabbert, 2017). 
Keyword category Average cost per click (US $) 
Business services 58.64 
Bail bonds 58.48 
Casino 55.48 
Lawyer 54.86 
Asset management 49.86 
Insurance 48.41 
Cash services & payday loans 48.18 
Cleanup & restoration services 47.61 
Degree 47.36 
Medical coding services 46.84 
 
Second, due to the limitations in tracking technologies, the farther a conversion is from the 
ad impression in the user’s decision-making process, the harder it becomes to track and 
attribute (more on tracking in section 4.2.3). In search advertising, it’s common that the 
conversion happens on the same device in the same session when the ad was clicked, 
making its effect easily measurable. In fact, many argue that most attribution models are, by 
ignoring various other online and offline touchpoints, showing inflated results for search 
advertising. 
It’s often profitable for businesses to also bid on their competitors’ brands. However, 
advertisers have to also bid on their own brand to ensure a user doesn’t see only 
competitors’ ads when searching for it. Consequently, the own brand’s keywords can 
constitute up to 50% of a search advertiser’s budget. 
Today, search advertising constitutes nearly half of total online ad spending (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Worldwide online ad spending in 2015, by format (US $ billions). “Other” includes email, mobile 
messaging and lead generation. (Liu, 2016) 
1.1.5! Ads move with users from desktop to mobile 
Until 2010, nearly all online advertising took place on desktop computers. With the increase 
in smartphone usage, online advertising saw a quick shift to mobile—defined by IAB (2017a) 
as “advertising tailored to and delivered through wireless mobile devices such as 
smartphones, feature phones (e.g., lower-end mobile phones capable of accessing mobile 
content), and media tablets”. Increased smartphone penetration and time spent on mobile 
enabled larger ad inventory, larger screens enabled more area to be dedicated for ads, and 
fast mobile networks allowed richer and more engaging ad formats to be used. In the 
United States, mobile advertising constituted just 2.3% of online ad spending in 2010, but it 
surpassed non-mobile spend already in 2016 (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Online ad spending in the United States, by device type (US $ billions). (IAB, 2017) 
Although not having seen as rapid a shift as ad spending, mobile accounted for 34% of 
online retail purchases in March 2016 (Google, 2016). The consumer decision-making 
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journey is becoming more and more dispersed across multiple channels: 61% of internet 
users start shopping on one device but continue or finish on a different one, and 82% of 
smartphone users say they consult their phones on purchases they're about to make in a 
store (Google, 2016). The purchase journey is increasingly being recorded as digital 
touchpoints, but they form a complex network posing a difficult challenge for unified 
tracking. 
1.2! A glance at Google and Facebook 
In 2015, Google and Facebook together made 43% of the global net advertising revenue. 
Both of them operate popular online services, and advertising is their primary revenue 
source but the types of ads they serve differ. Google dominates all search advertising and 
runs some display advertising outside its properties while Facebook serves only display ads, 
mostly on its own properties (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Net online ad revenues worldwide in 2015, by company and format (US $ billions). After traffic 
acquisition costs (TAC) to partner sites. (Liu, 2016) 
 
1.2.1! Google 
Google started in 1998 as a search engine but has rapidly grown to a series of products 
beyond that, including email service Gmail, office suite & cloud storage Drive, video 
sharing service YouTube, web browser Chrome, mobile operating system Android, 
smartphone Pixel and smart speaker Home—many of them acquisitions (Google, n.d.). 
Google made its initial public offering (IPO) in 2004 (Google, n.d.). In 2015, it was moved 
under a freshly established umbrella company Alphabet Inc that was founded to host the 
company’s efforts not directly related to Google’s business such as the self-driving car 
company Waymo (Alphabet Inc., 2017). 
The majority of Google’s products are free to use for consumers and are funded by ads: in 
2016, advertising constituted 89% of Google’s revenue (before subtracting traffic acquisition 
costs [TAC]; Alphabet Inc., 2017). The company launched its first ads in Google Search in 
2000 (Google, 2000). It moved to display ads by launching AdSense—its ad network and 
partner program for publishers—in 2003 and buying DoubleClick—an ad exchange with 
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software products for all sides of the platform—in 2007 (Google, 2003; Google, 2007). 
Search ads are still the bigger side of the business: out of Google’s 2015 net ad revenue, 
approximately $44.0B was from search and $9.07B from display (Liu, 2016). 
Table 2 lists Google’s sources of ad inventory. Currently, all ads on Google’s properties—
92% of its net ad revenue (Alphabet Inc., 2017)—are sold through its closed AdWords 
platform. Third-party buying of display ads on YouTube.com was previously possible 
through DoubleClick Ad Exchange, but Google stopped supporting it in 2015 (Mohan, 
2015). The ads Google sells outside its properties are from publishers selling their inventory 
directly to Google’s ad network AdSense and from third-party ad networks. Advertisers can 
buy this inventory through the closed AdWords platform (as a part of Display Network or 
Search Network) or through Google’s open DoubleClick Ad Exchange. 
 
Table 2. Google’s sources of ad inventory, by placement and type of buying. 
 Closed buying Open buying 
Served on own properties Google Search 
Play Store 
YouTube 
Gmail 
(YouTube, – 2015) 
Served on third-party properties Display Network 
Search Network 
DoubleClick Ad Exchange 
 
1.2.2! Facebook 
Facebook started in 2004 as a social networking platform and is nowadays also operating 
social image sharing service Instagram, mobile messaging application WhatsApp and 
virtual reality hardware maker Oculus—all of them acquisitions (Facebook, n.d. -a). 
In 2016, 97% of Facebook’s revenue came from advertising (Facebook, 2017). In the early 
days of the platform, it was monetized by letting Microsoft to exclusively serve its ads on the 
site through its exchange (Facebook, 2006; Schonfeld, 2010). Facebook launched its first 
“native” ads in 2007—these were based on businesses having a social presence on the 
platform, and they were made an integrated, unobtrusive, part of the user experience 
(Facebook, 2007). The company had part of its ad inventory on its properties sold and 
served by third parties through Facebook Exchange (FBX) from 2012 to 2016 (Constine, 
2012; Ha, 2016). 
Table 3 lists Facebook’s sources of ad inventory. Currently, all ads are sold through the 
company’s closed ad buying platform. Most of the ads sold are served on Facebook’s 
properties. In addition to them, Facebook offers Audience Network—launched in 2014—
allowing its advertisers to expand their campaigns to partnering third-party application and 
websites while still using Facebook’s ad buying and targeting (Facebook, 2014). 
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Table 3. Facebook’s sources of ad inventory, by placement and type of buying. 
 Closed buying Open buying 
Served on own properties Facebook 
Instagram 
Messenger 
(Microsoft Ads, 2006 – 2010) 
(Facebook Exchange, 2012 – 2016) 
Served on third-party properties Audience Network (LiveRail, 2014 – 2016) 
(Atlas DSP, 2013 – 2016) 
 
Also, the company has briefly facilitated open ad buying outside its properties with video ad 
network LiveRail and demand-side platform (DSP) Atlas—both from acquisitions—but 
closed them purportedly to favor Audience Network (Peterson, 2016). 
1.3! Research questions 
In just 23 years, the online advertising industry has grown from zero to encompassing more 
than third of the world’s total advertising spending and gone through significant changes in 
its dynamics. The two largest companies, Google and Facebook, are capturing more than 
40% of the net online advertising revenue. This thesis explores what that revenue is made 
up of. 
While there’s a widely used system for selling and purchasing ads through ad exchanges, 
many of the largest publishers—including Google and Facebook—have chosen to build 
their own infrastructure for selling and serving ads. The extant literature on closed ad 
platforms and their implications is scarce. This thesis explores closed ad platforms in more 
detail. 
The research questions are the following: 
1.! What are the main factors determining the revenue of online advertising platforms? 
2.! What drives publishers to establish their own closed ad platforms instead of selling 
their inventory for third-party ad platforms? 
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2! Theory 
This section is divided into two parts. First, an overview of the online advertising literature 
is provided. Second, theory on multi-sided platforms is used to help to define the concept of 
closed ad platform, mostly absent from the online advertising literature. 
2.1! Online advertising 
Evans (2009) defines online advertising as “advertising delivered over the Internet”. In some 
contexts, it’s called internet advertising (Bergemann & Bonatti, 2011). It is also often used 
interchangeably with the term digital advertising which, technically, is an umbrella term also 
encompassing advertising delivered over digital media other than the Internet, e.g., SMS 
advertising but, in practice, there’s no clear division between the terms and almost all digital 
advertising is also online advertising. 
According to Evans (2009), the fundamental differences between online and offline 
advertising result from the internet technologies and the nature of the web which enable 
learning considerably more about online users. This allows advertisers to target relevant 
messages to consumers who are most likely to take action as a result of receiving them 
(Evans, 2009). 
2.1.1! Types of online advertising 
There are taxonomies of varying granularity for online advertising. Goldfarb (2013) divides 
it into three general categories: display advertising, search advertising and classified 
advertising. There are also some formats that don’t fall into these categories, such as email 
and digital audio ads, but as can be seen from Figure 5 (p. 15), their share of total online ad 
spending is marginal. 
2.1.1.1! Display advertising 
According to Goldfarb (2013), Display advertising includes “simple banner ads, plain text 
ads (such as Google’s AdSense), media-rich ads, video ads, and the typical ads that are 
shown on social media websites such as Facebook” (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. An example of display ads on techcrunch.com [emphasis added]. The publisher sells its ads through 
ad exchanges and insertion orders. 
The pricing of display advertising varies by publisher, from fixed pricing and negotiated 
purchases to specialized auction mechanisms. Typically, advertisers pay per impression or 
click. (Goldfarb, 2013) 
2.1.1.2! Search advertising 
According to Goldfarb (2013), search advertising is “the advertising that appears along with 
the algorithmic (or ‘organic’) results on search engines such as Google or Bing” (Figure 9). 
Terms paid search (Laffey, 2007) and sponsored search (Jansen & Mullen, 2008) are also used to 
describe the same concept. 
Search ads are targeted based on the users’ search keyword strings and thus allow 
advertisers to show relevant ads at the exact moment when users are looking for something. 
Typically, the advertisers pay when the user clicks on an ad, and a special-purpose auction 
mechanism determines the price. (Goldfarb, 2013) 
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Figure 9. An example of search ads on google.com [emphasis added]. The ads are sold in Google’s 
Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction. 
According to Sayedi et al. (2014), one of the main characteristics differentiating search from 
other forms of advertising is that, instead of building awareness, it uses technology to enable 
targeting customers in the later stages of the purchase process, usually with a higher 
conversion rate. The authors argue that this quality makes advertisers inclined to free-ride 
on their competitors’ awareness-building efforts and poach potential customers from them. 
However, the authors continue to use game theory to prove that the search engines benefit 
from limiting competition in their auctions which is in line with Google, Yahoo! and Bing 
using “keyword relevance scores” to discourage bidding on competitors’ keywords. (Sayedi 
et al., 2014) 
2.1.1.3! Classifieds advertising 
According to Goldfarb (2013), classified advertising consists of “advertising that appears on 
websites that do not provide other media content or algorithmic search” (Figure 10). Online 
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classified ads are a substitute for their offline equivalents in local newspapers. Online job 
and dating sites also fit into this category. (Goldfarb, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 10. An example of classified ads on craigslist.com [emphasis added]. The service provider charges $75 
for each job posting in San Francisco Bay Area. 
2.1.2! Targeting 
Goldfarb (2013) argues that the most fundamental economic difference of online advertising 
to offline advertising is its substantially lower cost of targeting. It is made possible by the 
Internet’s one-to-one communication between identifiable computers (Goldfarb, 2013). 
Targeting enables advertisers to more effectively find suitable consumers for their 
advertisement messages, consequently helping smaller businesses to access advertising 
markets (Bergemann & Bonatti, 2011). 
Goldfarb (2013) categorizes targeting into three forms: demographic, contextual and 
behavioral (Table 4). Demographic targeting, mostly used in display advertising, can be at its 
simplest just selecting the publishers with the appropriate audience demographics but 
nowadays advertisers can target specific demographic subgroups within the overall 
audience based on information users provide online. In contextual targeting, the content of the 
website is used to select the ads displayed on it. This is the way how search ads are mainly 
targeted: they match to the keywords of the search. Targeting options in classifieds ads are 
mostly limited in grouping the listings by category and geographical location which also falls 
under contextual targeting. Behavioral targeting involves using users’ data based on their past 
online behavior to determine if they are a good fit for an ad. A special form of behavioral 
targeting, retargeting, involves showing users content similar to the one they’ve previously 
interacted with. (Goldfarb, 2013) 
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Table 4. Forms of targeting commonly used with types of online advertising. 
 Display Search Classifieds  
Demographic Specific publisher’s main 
audience 
Demographic subgroups 
Demographic subgroups 
(such as geographic 
region) 
 
Contextual Page content Search keywords Listing category & 
location 
Behavioral Browsing & search 
behavior 
Retargeting 
  
 
2.1.3! Auctions 
Auctions have become the dominant method for selling online advertising (Goldfarb, 2013). 
Goldfarb (2013) argues this is the result of reduced targeting costs online, driven by both the 
need to price a large number of keywords efficiently and a desire to price discriminate 
between advertisers. 
The first online ad auctions were implemented in search advertising and used Generalized 
First-Price (GFP) auction: the advertiser with the highest bid wins the first slot and pays the 
price equal to its bid. The advertiser who bids second highest wins the second slot, pays the 
price equal to its bid and so on. While the concept of GFP is simple, it quickly results into 
bidding wars as each bidder has the incentive to lower their bids as close as possible to the 
next advertiser’s bid—until someone starts raising their bid again, causing an ever-
continuing cycle. (Edelman & Ostrovsky, 2007) 
Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction—used, for example, by Google to sell its search 
ads—addresses that problem. In it, the slots are allocated in the same way, but each bidder 
only pays the next highest bid price plus some small delta. (Jansen & Mullen, 2008) Vickrey 
(1961) proves that second-price auctions can be incentive compatible—i.e., the optimal strategy 
for bidders is to bid their true valuation—under certain conditions such as single item 
auctioned once with sealed bids (not fulfilled by GSP). So, while GSP eliminates some 
wasteful strategic play compared to GFP, it’s not completely incentive compatible for 
auctioning multiple items which often is the case in online advertising. 
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction—used, for example, by Facebook (Metz, 2015)—is 
an incentive compatible version of the second-price auction for multiple items. In it, the 
bidders pay the externalities imposed on the other bidders—i.e., a bidder pays the price 
equal to the difference to the total value the other bidders would have captured if that 
bidder wouldn’t have participated in the auction. This maximizes the auctioneer’s profit 
and ensures that the item is sold to the bidder who values it the most. (Jansen & Mullen, 
2008) Before the emergence of online advertising, the VCG mechanism was generally 
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thought to be of academic interest only due to fear of cheating and disincentives to follow 
truth-revealing strategies (Rothkopf et al., 1990). 
Table 5 illustrates a very simple VCG auction. Bidder A uses a bid equal to its true value 
but ends up only paying the price equal to bidder B. Thus, there’s no incentive to change 
the bid. Bidder C doesn’t get the item but doesn’t have an incentive to increase its bid—
otherwise, it would have to pay more than its true value if it wins the item. 
 
Table 5. An example of VCG auction with three participants bidding their true value for one item in an auction 
of two items. 
 Bidder A Bidder B Bidder C 
True value for an item 5 4 3 
Bid 5 4 3 
Outcome Win Win Lose 
Value of outcome 5 4 0 
Value of outcome if 
bidder 1 didn’t 
participate 
 4 3 
Value of outcome if 
bidder 2 didn’t 
participate 
5  3 
Value of outcome if 
bidder 3 didn’t 
participate 
5 4  
Total value of outcome 
if this bidder didn’t 
participate 
4 + 3 = 7 5 + 3 = 8 5 + 4 = 9 
Total value of outcome 
for other bidders 
4 + 0 = 4 5 + 0 = 5 5 + 4 = 9 
Payment (externality 
imposed to others) 
7 – 4 = 3 8 – 5 = 3 9 – 9 = 0 
Net utility 5 – 3 = 2 4 – 3 = 1 0 – 0 = 0 
 
Table 6 illustrates a similar setup for a GSP auction. Both bidder A and bidder B get the 
same item, but bidder B pays more for it, thus having an incentive to bid less than its true 
value and even less than bidder B—as long as it wins the item. If bidder A and bidder B are 
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competitors, bidder B has an incentive to bid as high as possible while still bidding less than 
bidder A—this increases the amount bidder A has to pay while it doesn’t affect how much 
bidder B pays. Thus, the bidders are likely to speculate what others are bidding to 
maximize their net utility, causing them to diverge from bidding their true value and 
causing instability in the auction. 
 
Table 6. An example of GSP auction with three participants bidding their true value for one item in an auction 
of two items. 
 Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 
True value for an item 5 4 3 
Bid 5 4 3 
Outcome Win Win Lose 
Value of outcome 5 4 0 
Payment (next highest 
bid) 
4 3 0 
Net utility 5 – 4 = 1 4 – 3 = 1 0 – 0 = 0 
 
Szymanski and Lee (2006) find in their simulation based on a search advertising setting with 
dynamic bid strategies that unstable bidding patterns caused by lack of incentive 
compatibility also remain when changing from GFP to GSP auction (Figure 11). Because of 
the instability of GFP and GSP, from the platform’s perspective, VCG yields the most 
revenue when advertisers’ minimum return on investment (ROI) is zero, i.e., the costs equal 
the profits. However, if the advertisers demand an ROI higher than zero, VCG is the most 
affected auction mechanism as any decrease in the price they are willing to pay is directly 
reflected to all bids. (Symanski & Lee, 2006) 
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Figure 11. The “Sawtooth” bid pattern in GFP and GSP of the bidder with the highest true value with 
dynamically adjusting bid strategy (Symanski & Lee, 2006). 
The bids are typically not entered in the auction as they are but are instead combined with 
various quality scores that try to estimate the ad’s relevance to the user seeing it. Effectively, 
the ranking of advertisers in the auction is based on both the platform’s expected revenue 
and the users’ perceived interest. (Jansen & Mullen, 2008) 
2.1.4! Measurement 
Goldfarb (2013) notes that “the literature that measures online ad effectiveness is thriving” 
and attributes the effect mostly to the relative ease of measuring online advertising. 
Immediate responses such as clicks are easily logged and, in many cases, the advertisers can 
track if the persons who’ve seen ads complete the desired transaction. Furthermore, the 
one-to-one communications between the media source and the user enable easy 
experiments, also allowing randomization at the end-user level. (Goldfarb, 2013) 
However, Goldfarb (2013) calls for recognizing that, despite those advantages, there remain 
significant challenges and refers to a study by Lewis et al. (2011) demonstrating how 
observational methods can overstate the effectiveness of advertising. Furthermore, Lewis 
and Rao (2013) argue that as the performance of a single campaign is difficult to evaluate 
with precision, some parties on the ad supply side are not incentivized to report ROI 
estimates truthfully and selectively filtered reports with noisy data might be hard to prove 
wrong. 
Berman (2015) uses an analytical model to demonstrate that advertising performance can 
be compromised if the optimization is linked to an attribution model not aligned with the 
advertiser’s goals—demonstrating that attribution is not only a measurement issue but can 
also affect the campaign efficiency. This can be caused by the baseline conversion rate of 
consumers (i.e., the share of users who would convert also without seeing ads) which often is 
the case with last-touch attribution which only credits the last ad shown before a conversion. 
(Berman, 2015) 
Lewis et al. (2011) conclude that those biases can be avoided with fully randomized 
experiments—the gold-standard for measuring “treatment” effects. However, Lewis and 
Rao (2013) show that sometimes—as the advertiser is trying to notice a relatively subtle 
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effect in an environment with a huge random variation—massive tests have to be 
conducted to determine in a statistically significant way if a campaign is profitable. 
2.1.5! Performance-based pricing 
Publishers can make various improvements to increase the effectiveness of the ad 
campaigns on their sites. While some of these—such as the ad’s size, placement, and 
schedule—are contractible, many of the efforts are either impossible or too expensive for 
the advertiser to observe and monitor. An example of these non-contractible efforts is the 
platform’s ability to use contextual, demographic and behavioral targeting to serve the ads 
to the users who’re most likely interested in them. (Hu et al., 2016) 
If publishers are only paid based on the number of impressions they serve, they’re 
incentivized to only focus on attracting bigger audiences with better content. Using 
performance-based pricing—online i.e. linking advertising payments directly to campaign 
measurement data—gives incentives for both the publisher and the advertiser to make non-
contractual efforts to improve the effectiveness of advertising. (Hu et al., 2016) 
Hu et al. (2016) further compare two performance-based pricing models: cost per click 
(CPC) and cost per action (CPA). CPA model—being closer to the advertiser’s desired end 
result than CPC model—is considered to be preferred by advertisers as it gives a greater 
incentive for the publishers to exert incremental efforts. However, some publishers fear that 
CPA shifts most of the advertising campaign risk to them and doesn’t incentivize advertisers 
to improve their efforts. (Hu et al., 2016) 
In ad auctions, typically, instead of choosing the winning advertisers purely based on their 
CPA bid, publishers rank advertisers based on the expected revenue using historical data 
from them (Hu et al., 2016). Based on a mathematical model, Hu et al. (2016) show that in 
general, the CPA model achieves greater social welfare than CPC as long as the estimates 
match the reality. 
2.1.6! Ad platforms 
Online advertising is a two-sided business in which consumers consent to receive 
advertising messages in exchange for content and services and advertisers pay to send these 
messages. Between them are various intermediaries, most of them also operating multi-
sided platforms. The fully integrated intermediaries touch directly both advertisers and 
consumers. For example, most search engines operate like this. Intermediaries can be also 
partly integrated, for example, publishers combining direct sales and ad networks. (Evans, 
2009) 
The various agents involved are presented in Table 7. In this thesis, the businesses 
incorporating at least the intermediation function, responsible of managing and selling ad 
inventory, are called ad platforms. The term closed ad platform is used for publishers running 
their own intermediation—often referred to as “walled gardens”.  
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Table 7. The relationship between online advertising businesses. Ordered by relative position: uppermost 
closest to advertisers; bottommost closest to consumers. (Evans, 2009) 
Business Function 
Advertising agencies and creative tools Producing ads 
Advertiser tools Managing ad campaigns, sending ads to publishers 
Intermediation: ad networks, ad exchanges, direct 
sales 
Matching advertisements to inventory and setting 
prices 
Publisher tools Managing publisher inventory, serving ads into ad 
space 
Publishers Attracting consumers with content 
 
2.2! Open and closed platforms 
Multi-sided platforms are entities enabling direct interactions between two or more distinct 
customer groups—such as buyers and sellers or consumers and advertisers—so that each 
side is affiliated with the platform by continually making platform-specific investments 
necessary for the interaction (Hagiu & Wright, 2015). They are typically characterized by 
the presence of network effects or non-neutral price structure between the groups—features 
often used to distinguish multi-sided platforms but shown by Hagiu & Wright (2015) not to 
be sufficient for defining them. 
Publishers are a particular type of multi-sided platform Casadesus!Masanell & Zhu (2013) 
call a sponsor-based business model: the platform monetizes its product (content) through 
sponsors (advertisers) instead of charging its customer base directly. To persuade the 
sponsors to pay, the platform needs its consumers to provide something to them in return 
(look at ads). As a result, the utility the consumers derive from the product or service can be 
decreased, often in the form of impoverished consumption experience. 
According to Eisenmann et al. (2009), multi-sided platforms have two distinct roles: 
sponsors and providers. Platform sponsors control the platform’s technology and determine 
who may participate as a provider or user but don’t deal directly with the users. Platform 
providers adhere to the platform’s rules and supply its components, being the users’ primary 
point of contact. Each role may be fulfilled by one or multiple companies, resulting in four 
possible models for organizing platforms (Table 8).  
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Table 8. Platform governance structures (Eisenmann et al., 2009) 
 One provider Multiple providers 
One sponsor Proprietary Licensing 
Multiple sponsors Joint Venture Shared 
 
A platform can have a varying degree of openness—i.e., uniformness or lack of restrictions 
on participation to development, commercialization or use—in several dimensions 
(Eisenmann et al., 2009). Of the four structures mentioned above, the proprietary model is the 
most closed. In this thesis, the term closed ad platform refers to publishers operating with the 
proprietary governance structure—such as Google and Facebook. Correspondingly, the 
shared model is the most open. The programmatic ad buying ecosystem falls into this 
category as it’s operated by a plethora of providers based on standards evolved without a 
centralized sponsor. 
Strategies employed by platform sponsors can be categorized as horizontal or vertical 
(Table 9). Absorbing complements is a vertical strategy especially important to proprietary 
providers and makes it harder for the standalone third-party suppliers of those complements 
to compete. It can add efficiency gains through economies of scope in customer acquisition 
and quality advantages through simplification of interfaces in addition to helping to avoid 
double marginalization from separate monopolists. A platform envelopment occurs when the 
absorbed complement is itself a platform. (Eisenmann et al., 2009) 
 
Table 9. Platform sponsors’ horizontal and vertical strategies (Eisenmann et al., 2009). 
 Horizontal strategies Vertical strategies 
Description Target a company’s current and 
potential competitors 
Open or close the platform’s 
supply-side 
Examples Interoperating with established 
rival platforms 
Licensing additional platform 
providers 
Broadening a platform’s 
sponsorship 
Managing backward compatibility 
with prior platform generations 
Securing exclusive rights to certain 
complements 
Absorbing complements into the 
core platform 
 
Successful proprietary platform providers can often exploit their market power to extract a 
significant share of the economic value generated through platform transactions. However, 
they have to leverage their dominance without provoking end users, complementors, 
regulators and antitrust authorities too much. Aggressive value extraction can lead to users 
perceiving their platform provider to abuse its power and, for example, rally around new 
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market entrants. On the other hand, too loose control can lead to decreased 
competitiveness and the platform being enveloped by another platform. (Eisenmann et al., 
2009) 
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3! Methods 
It’s worth mentioning that I’ve worked for a technology partner operating in the Facebook’s 
ad ecosystem for close to three years. While that has accumulated me a lot of knowledge, it 
also involves inevitable biases that—despite my efforts to overcome them—have affected 
how the data was collected and interpreted. On the other hand, I believe having worked 
directly with dozens of online advertisers prior to this study and knowing the technology 
applied by the ad platforms allows me to form a deep understanding required for a 
thorough synthesis of the subject. 
3.1! Case study research 
This thesis researches the phenomenon of closed online advertising platforms through the 
inductive case study method. Building theory with case studies involves creating theoretical 
constructs and propositions from case-based, empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Yin 
(2009) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. 
According to Yin (2009), case studies are the preferred method for studies asking “how” or 
“why” questions. Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the method is especially suitable 
for new research areas with yet insufficient theory. This indeed is the case with closed 
online ad platforms: while the existing literature can explain some of the basic online 
advertising concepts, it’s not up-to-date with the most recent developments of the rapidly-
changing industry. Neither does it provide the satisfactory theory on what are the factors 
contributing to the competitiveness of closed ad platforms. One sign of this is that there 
doesn’t even seem to be an agreed upon term for “closed ad platform”. 
3.2! Case selection 
Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) note that the sampling in case study research should be 
theoretical instead of representing some population as the goal is to develop theory instead 
of testing it. Revelatory and exemplary cases particularly suitable for finding logic between 
constructs should be selected. 
Google (Alphabet, Inc.) and Facebook (Facebook, Inc.) were chosen as the cases because 
they have been leading the change in online advertising innovation, can be considered 
extraordinarily competitive and constituted 43% of the whole industry in terms of net ad 
revenue after traffic acquisition costs in 2015 (Figure 4, p. 12). As this thesis strives to 
understand better the strategic reasons why publishers opt to establish their closed ad 
platforms, it is worth taking a closer look at the strategies the case companies have used to 
reach their market positions. 
In addition to having quite a different portfolio of consumer-facing products, they represent 
well the two dominant types of advertising: Google has mostly concentrated on search ads, 
and Facebook is only serving display ads (Figure 7, p. 16). The customer base of the 
company I work for also ensured superior access to the appropriate people for studying 
these two cases. 
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Using multiple cases is considered to create more robust theory because the propositions 
are more deeply grounded in varied empirical evidence (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). 
However, the small number of cases in this study can be justified by their uniqueness—an 
argument Yin (2009) also uses as a rationale for single-case studies. The cases in a study 
should be regarded analogous to multiple experiments (not multiple subjects within an 
experiment), standing as their own analytical units and serving as replications, contrasts, or 
extensions to the emerging theory (Yin, 2009). 
3.3! Data collection 
According to Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007), interviews are an efficient way to gather rich, 
empirical data about intermittent and strategic phenomena. The authors stress the 
importance of using many knowledgeable interviewees who view the case from diverse 
perspectives to make it less likely that they engage in convergent retrospective sense-making 
or impression management. 
41 interviews with 33 advertisers were conducted between February and May 2017 (full list 
in Appendix 1). The companies were selected on the basis of the estimated scale and 
technological sophistication of their digital marketing activities on Google and Facebook in 
addition to access to the relevant people working at them. Most of the advertisers 
interviewed were customers of the company I represented. The most common industries 
they operated in were e-commerce and travel. In addition to direct advertisers, some of 
them were marketing agencies, running campaigns for their client companies; and some 
were group or venture capital companies, overseeing the marketing activities of their 
portfolio companies (Figure 12). The aim was to get a diverse cross-section of advanced 
advertisers from the industries most present in online advertising. 
 
Figure 12. The advertisers interviewed, by industry 
The people interviewed were mostly directors or heads of department, responsible for the 
strategic direction of a subset of digital marketing activities; or marketing managers, 
carrying out the day-to-day marketing operations. The rest of them were marketing team 
leads, overseeing a team of marketing managers; marketing technology managers, 
responsible of selecting the appropriate marketing technologies and partners across 
advertising channels; and executives, i.e., C-level management (Figure 13). As the literature 
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is lacking detailed and up-to-date descriptions of today’s online advertising, it was judged 
that this set of expert roles ranging from the people executing campaigns to the people 
making the strategic decisions provides the most accurate and insightful collection of data. 
 
Figure 13. The people interviewed, by title 
Also, six interviews with people representing advertising platforms or technology partners 
were conducted during the same timeframe (full list in Appendix 2). 
The interviews were semi-structured with mostly open-ended questions to allow us to 
flexibly get immersed in the topics the interviewees were the most knowledgeable about. As 
I was more familiar with Facebook to begin with, the questions had a bigger emphasis on 
Google. The focus was placed on the challenges the advertisers were facing as those 
manifest some of the most advanced aspects of online advertising, highlight the differences 
between platforms and indicate what are the issues the ad platforms might potentially 
address next. 
The interviews were conducted by me and my colleague and out of the total of 47 
interviews, I was present in 40. The interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes and were 
carried out in person, through a video call or a regular phone call. The interviewees gave 
recording permission in 19 interviews; the rest weren’t recorded. Thorough notes were 
written during the interviews and transcribed within 24 hours from them. 
3.4! Data analysis 
According to Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007), in case study research, the theory is developed 
by “recognizing patterns of relationships among constructs within and across cases and 
their underlying logical arguments”. The theory-building process is iterating between the 
case data and the emerging theory—later accompanied by the existing literature 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Even though the data analysis step is the least codified part 
of the process in case study research, there are tactics to introduce structure and diverse 
views in the analysis to avoid human information-processing biases and go beyond the 
initial impressions (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
As suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), the analysis started with becoming familiar with each 
case individually before starting the cross-case analysis to allow unique patterns to arise 
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before starting to generalize them. As there was also business interest in the findings 
emerging from the interviews, they were extensively discussed with several colleagues, 
including the management of the company I work for. 
Already after the first interviews, common patterns started to emerge. Whenever there was 
a feeling of saturation within a topic, it was left out from the interviews to accommodate 
new questions arisen from the improved understanding. It was also found out that some of 
the questions were too broad and we weren’t able to ask the appropriate clarifications due 
to our initial lack of understanding. That was later on addressed by more explicitly asking 
about specific ad products which seemed to catalyze the interviewees’ thoughts. It also 
surprised us how fragmented Google’s advertising ecosystem was (at least compared to 
Facebook where we were coming from) which made us split the questions more based on 
the different ad products. 
The cross-case analysis utilized tactics recommended by Eisenhardt (1989): listing 
similarities and dissimilarities between the cases and analyzing them through a number of 
dimensions. The latter supported the former: the primary framework for analysis (see 
section 4.2) was a mathematical model built on the generalized cross-case learnings. The 
idea for the revenue equation indeed originated from the need to introduce structure to the 
analysis but later proved to be a valuable standalone contribution.  
Saloner (1991) argues that this kind of microeconomic modeling can be valuable in strategic 
management theory building. Especially the models that assume complex rationality—such 
as game-theoretic models—should not be used literally, but rather metaphorically. In 
contrary to most models in management science trying to algorithmically produce the 
answer to a problem based on some inputs, the primary interest in metaphorical 
microeconomic modeling is to understand how the model works. Another benefit of 
mathematical modeling—compared to e.g. the boxes-and-arrows modeling widely used in 
theory development in strategic management—is that it’s easier for the reader to review the 
underlying assumptions critically. (Saloner, 1991) 
The foundation of the price dynamics analysis was largely based on my prior understanding 
of the subject but was supported by the collected data as it was decided to act as a bridge 
from the auction literature to the revenue equation. 
Lastly, the emergent theory was compared with the existing literature—for finding both 
similarities and conflicts. Ignoring conflicts with literature would decrease the confidence in 
the findings and potentially cause missing the opportunity to deepen both the existing and 
the emergent theory and better define the limits of generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989). Most 
of the time, the findings were in line with the literature. Literature especially helped to form 
a consistent terminology with unambiguous definitions and boundaries. 
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4! Results 
4.1! Price dynamics 
Online ad auctions enable finding a market price for each ad impression, i.e., when a 
specific individual sees an ad in a particular place on a particular publisher’s site or 
application. Some of the typical mechanisms used are GSP and VCG auctions (see section 
2.1.3). In general, each impression is sold to the advertiser valuing it the most with a price 
determined by what others are willing to pay for it. 
The value of an impression to an advertiser equals the conversion rate (CVR)—i.e., the 
estimated probability of the user to complete the desired action as a result of seeing the 
ad—multiplied by the value of that action to the advertiser. The estimation is based on 
historical tracking data, and its accuracy can also be checked post hoc. 
As explained in section 2.1.5, sometimes publishers auction clicks or other actions instead of 
impressions. While the values advertisers define in this type of auction are called “bids”, 
they often don’t participate in the auction per se but are converted to the actual bids 
instead. This is based on the publishers’ estimates of the probability of users to click the ad 
or complete the defined action. Sometimes the publishers also incorporate a relevance 
factor in the auction to weigh-in the ads’ estimated effect on user experience. 
The publisher can either bear the risk instead of the advertiser—and typically take a price 
premium for that—or leave the risk for the advertiser while still optimizing delivery for the 
desired actions. For example, Facebook’s bidding system nominally charges for impressions, 
leaving the advertiser to pay a small amount for the delivery in case there are no 
conversions (Facebook, n.d. -b). This properly incentivizes the advertisers to see the effort to 
improve their campaign performance. However, Facebook still has the incentive to exert 
non-contractual efforts to get the most conversions for the advertiser as they know that’s 
what they’re in the end measured against when determining the advertising budgets. This 
seems like the optimal solution to the issues with CPA pricing model Hu et al. (2016) 
present in their paper (see section 2.1.5). 
A more traditional way to sell ads is through insertion orders (IO) in which the publisher 
agrees to serve a certain amount of impressions to a certain target audience in a certain 
timeframe for a certain price. In many cases, the advertiser has a clear idea of the audience 
so that it can estimate the implications the campaign will have to its business. While 
typically this is not as effective as impression-level bidding, in the end, the value of the ads 
to the advertiser is determined by the proven or estimated results achieved from them and 
the price other advertisers are willing to pay. One publisher can sell ads using multiple 
different ways simultaneously. 
In conclusion, the ad prices are determined by supply and demand—each advertiser 
valuing ad impressions based on their estimated average impact on its business. Different 
purchasing types allow different levels of granularity and affect the effectiveness of ad 
buying. 
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4.1.1! Pricing from an advertiser’s perspective 
As the price of ads is determined by what others are willing to pay, the profitability of an 
advertiser’s efforts is determined by how much more efficiently it can reach its target 
audience than others. If others can get better results from the same impressions, they’re 
willing to pay more for them. Increased impression prices require more efficiency from an 
advertiser to maintain the same level of profitability. 
Profitability varies by scale. The smaller and more well-known the audience, the better the 
performance usually is. Correspondingly, the larger the audience the advertiser wants to 
reach, the more expensive conversions get. For example, a golf equipment manufacturer is 
likely to get good returns targeting 50-year old men with high household income and 
interest in golf, but the more scale it wants, the more expensive each incremental result gets 
(Figure 14). This can result from either decreasing conversion rate (targeting audience 
segments with less purchase intention) or increasing costs to reach the audience (targeting 
audience segments more valuable to other advertisers). 
 
 
Figure 14. An advertiser’s results as a function of advertising spend 
The shape of the curve can vary between advertisers and channels. For a niche product, the 
marginal cost rises steeper whereas a mass-market product can get good performance also 
at a significant scale. The position of the curve can be shifted by making optimizations in ad 
serving—either by the advertiser or the ad platform. 
Typically, advertisers’ budgets are determined by the profitability of advertising. I.e., when 
an advertiser determines its budgets for an ad channel, they analyze their performance data 
measured in, for example, (marginal) cost per action (CPA) or (marginal) return on ad 
spend (ROAS). In theory, an advertiser maximizes its profits by setting its budget at the 
point in which the marginal cost reaches the marginal benefit (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15. Determining advertising budget based on marginal cost of results and value of an incremental result 
In practice, there are various ways for accomplishing this: some of the advertisers 
interviewed are flexible with the maximum budget as long as the marginal cost of results 
stay within the target range while others set the total marketing budget, e.g., quarterly 
based on the last quarter’s results. 
Setting the budget to the optimal point maximizes what we call here advertiser surplus—the 
difference between the value and cost of results, and essentially the total value an advertiser 
derives from its advertising efforts (Figure 16). Spending more would have a higher price 
than the value resulting from it and decrease advertiser surplus. Spending less would leave 
profitable opportunities unused and not maximize advertiser surplus. 
 
   
Figure 16. Calculating advertiser surplus from the marginal cost of results and value of an incremental result 
Other things equal, improvements in the effectiveness of ad serving—whether they 
originate from the advertiser’s or the ad platform’s efforts—are reflected as increases in 
advertising budgets: the advertisers adjust their budgets until a new equilibrium is reached 
(Figure 17). 
M
ar
gi
na
l c
os
t o
f r
es
ult
s
Total spend
Value of
incremental result
Advertising
budget
M
ar
gi
na
l c
os
t o
f r
es
ult
s
Total spend
Value of
incremental result
Advertising
budget
Advertiser
surplus
  38 
 
Figure 17. An advertiser adjusting to its new budget when advertising efficiency changes 
In practice, measuring value is non-trivial. Moreover, determining the distribution of value 
and cost—i.e., determining the marginal cost—might not be possible at a very granular 
level. Some of the advertisers interviewed often revert to use average cost (measured, e.g., in 
CPA or ROAS)—which is always lower than the marginal cost. Still, they aim to find a 
scale that maximizes their profitability. (If the advertisers paid the price equal to the value, 
their entire advertising efforts would yield zero profits.) 
The value is not necessarily determined in directly attributable profit. In customer 
acquisition, estimated lifetime value (LTV) might be used, and sometimes growing 
businesses are willing to acquire users unprofitably to reach a critical scale faster than their 
competitors. Sometimes a proxy metric is measured to estimate the actual goal it correlates 
with. Some of the advertisers interviewed allocate a separate budget for branding 
campaigns which are measured with clicks, video views or more advanced brand recall 
metrics.  Nevertheless, they define a monetary value for each conversion. 
4.1.2! Pricing from an ad platform’s perspective 
Ad platform revenue is made up of advertisers’ budgets. Because these budgets depend on 
measured performance, the publisher also has an incentive to improve advertisers’ 
performance. 
In other words, if an ad platform can deliver more results to its advertisers with the same 
amount of ad impressions, it’s reflected in the impression prices which comprise its revenue. 
Another way to think about this is that the platforms are selling measurable results instead 
of ad impressions. 
Figure 18 gives some indication of the rapid historical growth of impression prices on 
Facebook, although it should be kept in mind that the sample it uses is not representative of 
the whole platform—there are, e.g., significant differences in impression prices between 
countries. The increase of impression prices can be mostly explained by improvements in 
the efficiency of ad serving and increased value of measured conversions—as argued in the 
next section. 
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Figure 18. The average cost per thousand impressions (CPM, US $) of ads on Facebook delivered by 
advertisers using Nanigans software. Includes Audience Network; excludes Facebook Exchange and 
Instagram. The numbers reflect the company’s customer portfolio of mostly e-commerce, gaming, and other 
internet and mobile companies with $700 million annualized ad spend in 2018. (Nanigans, 2013 – 2018) 
4.2! The drivers of ad platform revenue 
Typically, ad platforms’ costs of delivering their service don’t scale proportionally with the 
number of users. Consequently, they can mostly ignore marginal costs other than the traffic 
acquisition cost and focus on maximizing their net advertising revenue. In this section, ad 
platforms’ net revenue is divided into its main components to help understand how ad 
platforms can affect it with their efforts. 
To begin with, the ad platforms are selling impressions, i.e., single views of an ad. Total 
advertising revenue in a certain timeframe can be expressed as 
!"#$%&'(')*+%$#$),$ - + . /%'0$+12+!"+'3/%$(('1)456+4789:;;4<=;4>? +
(1) 
Many ad platforms—such as demand-side platforms (DSP)—are buying impressions from 
partner sites, ad networks or ad exchanges and immediately reselling them to the end 
advertisers. The price the advertising platform pays for offsite impressions is called traffic 
acquisition cost (TAC). For impressions sold on the ad platform’s own properties, TAC is 
essentially zero. To compare revenues between the platforms, it’s more illustrative to use 
net advertising revenue after TAC. 
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The prices of ad impressions are determined in auctions or one-to-one contracts between 
the buyer and the seller (see section 4.1). For many of the impressions, the price the 
advertiser ends up paying is lower than how much the advertiser values it: 
 !"#$%&'($%+(,%/B,(+%!&$ - #!B,$+12+!"+'3/%$(('1) @ /%'0$+12+!"+'3/%$(('1)+#!B,$+12+!"+'3/%$(('1) C 
(3) 
which can be formulated as 
 /%'0$+12+!"+'3/%$(('1) - DC @ !"#$%&'($%+(,%/B,(+%!&$E F #!B,$+12+!"+'3/%$(('1)+
(4) 
The impressions themselves don’t have inherent value for the advertisers. Instead, their 
value is determined by the probability of a user to convert after seeing an ad—known as 
conversion rate (CVR)—and the value of that conversion to the advertiser: 
 GHIJK+LM+HN+OPQRKSSOLT - ULTGKRSOLT+RHVK+ F +PKHSJRKN+GHIJK+LM+ULTGKRSOLT 
(5) 
Therefore, we can express the total advertising revenue of a platform in the following form: 
 
)$&+!"#$%&'(')*+%$#$),$ - + . DC @ !"#$%&'($%+(,%/B,(+%!&$4EF 01)#$%('1)+%!&$4F 3$!(,%$"+#!B,$+12+01)#$%('1)4@&%!22'0+!0A,'('&'1)+01(&4
56+4789:;;4<=;
4>? +
(6) 
The components of (6) are listed in Table 10 along with their further subcomponents and 
main drivers which will be discussed in the following sections.  
                                               
 
1 Using (5) and QROUK+LM+HN+OPQRKSSOLT - ULTGKRSOLT+RHVK+ F QROUK+LM+ULTGKRSOLT, we can formulate (3) 
into HNGKRVOSKR+SJRQIJS+RHVK - WXYZ[+\]+^\_W[`ab\_cd`b^[+\]+^\_W[`ab\_WXYZ[+\]+^\_W[`ab\_  which is in line with the definition of 
advertiser surplus in section 4.1.1. 
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Table 10. The drivers and components of advertising platform’s net revenue. 
Driver Component Subcomponents 
Access to an active user base Ad impressions Users 
Visits per user 
Impressions per visit 
The effectiveness of ad serving Conversion rate  
The comprehensiveness of 
measurement 
The measured value of 
conversions 
The accuracy of measurement 
The value of conversions 
Ability to price discriminate Advertiser surplus rate  
Competition for off-premise 
impressions 
Traffic acquisition costs Distribution of on/off-premise 
impressions 
 
4.2.1! Access to an active user base 
The number of total impressions shown on a platform is typically determined by the 
number of its users and how actively they use the platform. The number can be further 
broken into subcomponents to illustrate this: !"+'3/%$(('1)( - ,($%(+ F +#'('&(+/$%+,($%+ F +'3/%$(('1)(+/$%+#'('& 
The number of impressions per visit is highly related to the characteristics of publisher 
platforms. In practice, all publishers tend to show as many ads as possible without making 
the user experience suffer too much. In search advertising, as the goal is to direct the users 
to what they were looking for, they typically see only one set of impressions per visit. In 
display advertising, the rate at which ads are shown is usually constant while the publishers 
try to maximize the amount of time spent on their premises in each visit. 
The number of visits per user also reflects the characteristics of publishers, mainly how 
engaging they are and how broad their offerings to their users are. For example, Facebook 
shows ads on its social media platform, messaging application Messenger and social image 
sharing platform Instagram. Google displays ads in its search engine, email client Gmail, 
video streaming service YouTube and mobile application database Play Store. 
The straightforward way to serve more ad impressions is to grow the user base. In May 
2017, Google had seven unique products with over one billion monthly active users (MAU) 
each (Matney, 2017). In June 2017, Facebook had two billion monthly active users 
(Constine, 2017a). For reference, there were 3.4 billion internet users globally in 2016 
(International Telecommunications Union, n.d.). 
They’ve reached such a scale in terms of money and user data that they can either acquire 
competitors or push them out of the market. For example, Google has acquired YouTube 
(1.5 billion MAU in June 2017). Facebook has bought Instagram (700 million MAU in 
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April 2017) and WhatsApp (1.2 billion MAU in June 2017). In August 2016, Facebook 
heavily took influences from Snapchat’s “Stories”, built a similar feature to Instagram, and 
its usage surpassed Snapchat’s in monthly active users in less than a year (Constine, 2017b). 
Both Google and Facebook even have programs for distributing internet access to 
developing countries—Project Loon and Internet.org respectively—as they have nearly 
reached saturation in developed countries. The profitability of these new users is, however, 
only a fraction of that in developed countries. 
However, the active user base doesn’t have to be on the ad platform’s own premises. Many 
ad platforms such as demand-side platforms (DSP) buy ad impressions from exchanges and 
resell them to the end advertisers. Closed platforms can also expand their advertising 
outside their premises. This allows them to show more impressions to their users while still 
utilizing the data they have on their users. The net revenue from off-premise impressions is 
significantly lower as explained in section 4.2.4. 
4.2.2! The effectiveness of ad serving 
Conversion rate (CVR) is defined as the probability of a user to convert after seeing an 
ad—or simply, the number of conversions divided by the number of impressions in a 
sample. It is determined by the platform’s capability to enable advertisers to show the right 
kind of advertisement to the right person. 
The quality of the ad creative—the media shown in the ad unit—has a significant effect on 
the conversion rate. While designing creatives is mostly done on the advertiser side, the 
platform can affect their quality via the supported creative formats: text, static images, 
video, interactive ads and so on. Closed platforms have more freedom with the ad formats 
than open platforms which have to adhere to a set of commonly defined standards (Internet 
Advertising Bureau [IAB], 2017b). Some examples of emerging creative formats are 
augmented and virtual reality ads that allow the user to, e.g., virtually travel to a destination 
or see how an apparel would look like when worn. Increasing immersiveness of ads, 
however, also increases their obtrusiveness and thus can’t be increased beyond a certain 
point without harming the user experience. 
To help the advertisers pick the optimal users to see a particular creative, platforms offer a 
variety of targeting options. The available options vary and typically reflect the amount of 
information the platform has about its users. Typical options include user demographics, 
location, interests and behaviors as well as the option to use first-party audiences collected 
by the advertiser. 
Both creative and targeting can be significantly improved by the platforms’ optimization. 
Optimization usually consists of automated techniques based on data analytics with the goal 
of directly improving advertiser results. In display advertising, a successful ad might be 
automatically shown to people similar to those who have already converted as a result of 
seeing it. In search advertising, investments might be shifted to the best-performing 
keywords. Alternatively, multiple permutations of a creative can be automatically generated 
and tested to choose the best performing one. 
As with targeting, most of the optimization techniques rely on detailed user or contextual 
data. Besides, optimization depends on high-quality measurement data about the variable 
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it’s trying to improve. While the sophistication of optimization varies from platform to 
platform, merely the amount of data available is already a big differentiator between them. 
The most advanced optimization methods are based on modeling the advertiser’s business 
and mapping the semantics of various user signals to it. For example, if a user has 
purchased flights to a destination, the optimized creative can feature hotels in that 
destination. This is discussed more in section 4.3.3. 
Targeting options and targeting optimization are somewhat overlapping solutions for 
maximizing campaign performance. While targeting options provide the advertisers with 
means to micro-manage the user segments seeing each ad, too strict targeting specifications 
don’t leave enough options for optimization to manage the ad delivery. Ideally, the 
advertiser only uses the amount of targeting proven to improve results, and lets 
optimization take care of the rest. 
However, optimization algorithms are typically opaque to the advertisers—especially when 
run by closed ad platforms or third parties—and while they improve the performance, the 
advertiser doesn’t get information of what kind of message resonates with each customer 
segment. The information can be valuable to the advertisers as it not only allows them to 
fine-tune their marketing messaging and long-term strategy across channels but signals how 
users perceive the advertisers’ offerings and allows them to use that information to develop 
their product or service further and improve interactions in their purchase path. Thus, the 
advertisers balance optimization and targeting to get the optimal ratio of performance and 
learnings out of their campaigns. Some of the advertisers interviewed mostly trust the 
platforms’ optimization while others take more control themselves with a more granular 
structure and micro-management. 
There are also other ways of improving the effectiveness of ad serving. For example, some 
platforms provide split testing tools to allow the advertisers to run controlled experiments to 
learn what kind of advertising setups perform best. Overall, both the platform and the end 
advertiser share the mutual goal of improving the ad serving with various techniques. 
4.2.3! The comprehensiveness of measurement 
Measuring the value of conversions relies on two complementary techniques: tracking and 
attribution. Tracking involves detecting and storing the desired actions users take. Attribution 
is about modeling which of those actions can be determined to have originated from a 
specific ad. 
Tracking relies on a multitude of methods. Online actions are typically tracked by matching 
the user’s device to a profile—either anonymous or containing personally identifiable 
information (PII). The devices are identified, for example, by their digital fingerprints 
(software and hardware configuration), their mobile advertising IDs or browser cookies 
stored on them. The matching can be deterministic (based on unique identifiers) or 
probabilistic (based on the probability that multiple matching values refer to the same 
entity). If a closed ad platform can get a user to log in to the service consistently, it can 
further match multiple devices to that single profile.  
Offline actions can be tracked, for example, by using unique offer coupon codes, matching 
PII collected from purchase orders or loyalty programs to an online profile, seeing which 
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Wi-Fi and Bluetooth beacons users’ devices connect to and monitoring the GPS-location of 
the user’s device. 
The level of invasiveness of data collection varies in both online and offline tracking 
methods. The more invasive methods usually involve users installing an application on their 
device. It’s possible for consumers to take measures to prevent many ways of tracking, 
ranging from disabling it from the service’s settings to installing tracking prevention 
software or not using the service at all. Doing that, however, is relatively uncommon—
either because people are not concerned about it or they don’t know how. 
Although attribution is a powerful tool required for almost any decision in performance 
marketing, it is based on observational methods and can never tell the full truth (as 
mentioned in section 2.1.4). For example, if a person sees an ad for a product and purchases 
it on the same day, it could be reasonably determined that the ad will get the credit for the 
conversion. But how to be sure that the person wouldn’t have made the purchase regardless 
of the ad? And if that person saw another ad after the first one before converting, which ad 
should get the credit? 
The decision is based on an attribution model. It determines which touchpoints—e.g., views 
and clicks—are counted and what are their relative priorities, how long are the timeframes 
for including each type of touchpoint and if multiple touchpoints are involved, how is the 
credit distributed for each ad. Some examples of typical attribution models are 
•! last-touch: always attribute the conversion to the ad that received the last interaction 
before conversion, 
•! time decay: distribute credit to multiple touchpoints so that the one closest to the 
conversion gets the most and 
•! position-based: assign, e.g., 40% of the credit to the first and last touchpoints each and 
distribute the remaining 20% to the rest of the touchpoints. 
A part of an attribution model is the lookback window, i.e., how long after the ad interaction 
can the conversion happen while still being attributed to the ad. Typical examples of 
lookback windows are 28 days after a click on an ad and one day after an ad impression 
without click but, ideally, each advertiser chooses the one most suitable for their business. 
Choosing the right attribution model is crucial for advertising performance. The wrong 
model can cause both humans and computers to direct ads to be shown to people who 
would have converted even without seeing them and consequently inflated performance 
numbers might falsely advise to invest more in the wrong campaigns. Correspondingly, 
failure to give credit to effective advertising will cause investments to it to disappear. Some 
of the interviewees even mentioned internal disputes in their companies when the choice of 
attribution model, for example, makes the social advertising team look bad compared to the 
search advertising team, consequently affecting their compensations. 
Not all types of conversions or advertising channels have the same basis to be appraised. 
The measured value of a conversion can be further broken down into two factors: 3$!(,%$"+#!B,$+12+01)#$%('1) - !00,%!0e+12+3$!(,%$3$)&+ F +#!B,$+12+01)#$%('1)+
These two are strongly related to each other. Digital performance advertising can be widely 
adopted in industries with conversions relatively easy to track and attribute to the ad 
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touchpoint—for example, installations and usage of mobile applications or purchases in an 
e-commerce store. 
In other industries, the advertising budgets can be constrained when accurate tracking and 
attribution is not available. For example, conversion tracking is significantly harder when 
the conversions happen offline or the buying process is long and includes many brand touch 
points from multiple channels and devices—which increasingly is the case as mobile 
advertising has rapidly grown alongside desktop in the recent years (see section 1.1.5). As an 
anecdotal rule, the more valuable the conversion, the harder it is to track and attribute—
mostly because the buying decisions are less impulsive and require more time and inputs for 
consideration. 
Also, some channels are better positioned to receive attributed conversions. For example, 
search ads are typically closer to purchase in the buyer decision-making process and thus 
have the tendency to be valued relatively more. This factor is partly out of the hands of the 
platforms, but they can affect it shaping their offering in a way that allows showing easier-
to-attribute ads. 
Another way for platforms to increase their accuracy and value of measured conversions is 
to build their own tracking and attribution systems. While some platforms make their 
advertisers rely on third-party measurement tools, a proprietary measurement system has 
many benefits. First, it allows the platforms to gather more granular data that can be better 
used for optimization as explained in section 4.2.2—without measurement, there’s no 
optimization. Second, it allows the platforms to gather user data from the advertisers’ 
websites and applications as explained in section 4.3.2. 
Third, it can be more accurate than third-party tracking and attribution as it can match all 
data across multiple browsers and devices to one user profile—although this applies only if 
the platform can enforce the users to log in while using the service. Practically all Facebook 
users are logged in whenever they’re using the platform and even most of the time when 
they’re not. Google requires login, e.g., for Gmail, and many of its products provide a 
better experience for logged-in users, but it’s not a requirement for access. Publishers 
merely providing static content for users to consume have a harder time trying to 
incentivize users to log in and have to resort to less reliable tracking methods such as 
browser cookies. 
Although they have a lot of benefits, the proprietary measurement systems are typically not 
capable of attributing the events to other platforms. As most conversions are a result of 
multiple ad touchpoints from various advertising channels, this results in multiple different 
platforms claiming the same conversion. Besides, they have different definitions for some 
metrics such as video views—e.g.. how many seconds does the video have to play and how 
big share of it has to be visible on the user’s screen—making them not comparable with 
each other. For those reasons, most advertisers base parts of their decision-making on a 
third-party measurement tool while using the platforms’ own systems for day-to-day 
optimization. 
As measurement has such a big impact on the advertising budgets, the platforms are 
inclined to influence it. The results reported based on platforms’ own tracking systems 
typically ignore any touchpoints from other advertising channels and are favorable for the 
platform. Google is offering Google Analytics, the most used website traffic analytics tool 
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(Empson, 2012), for free. Due to limitations in its tracking capabilities, ad touchpoints closer 
to the conversion—such as search ads—seem to perform disproportionally better. As those 
constitute the bulk of Google’s net advertising revenue (Liu, 2016), the platform is biased to 
preserve the status quo. Facebook, on the other hand, is rolling out their own free-to-use 
measurement suite Atlas, aiming to solve many of the current limitations in cross-channel 
tracking by using Facebook’s two billion user profiles for data matching. Atlas is likely to 
make Facebook look more attractive performance-wise for most advertisers compared to 
Google Analytics. 
There’s also one way to measure the real impact of a marketing campaign without 
attribution. A conversion lift test is a setup in which an ad is shown to a group of people and 
not shown to another group at all after which the lift in the chosen metric is calculated. A 
similar technique is used in many traditional advertising media such as television, print and 
billboards. The test groups are often selected based on e.g. geography which introduces a 
bias, although, with the help of digital tracking technologies, some ad platforms offer a way 
to set up a proper randomized controlled trial in which the subject groups are randomly 
generated from the same population just for the test so that they share the equal distribution 
of demographics and other properties. 
The upside of this approach is that no attribution modeling is required, but instead the real 
conversion lift can be measured. This is why the most sophisticated advertisers use data 
gathered from their conversion lift tests to improve their attribution models to be closer to 
the truth. But attribution modeling still stays very relevant. To get statistically significant 
results, conversion lift tests require large amounts of data and thus substantial budgets. 
They can’t be used as a tool in day-to-day decision-making and optimization. 
4.2.4! Ability to price discriminate 
As explained in section 4.1.1, we can’t expect the advertisers to pay their full value for each 
impression. The ad platforms can lower the advertiser surplus to some extent by being 
effective at price discrimination. However, most of them are already equally efficient at 
price discrimination, and thus, this is not a measure they can use to increase their 
competitiveness significantly. 
According to Samuelson & Marks (2012, p. 100), to price discriminate profitably, a firm 
must: 
1.! identify market segments that differ with respect to price elasticity of demand and 
2.! be able to enforce the different prices paid by different segments. 
In online advertising, the heterogeneousness of ad inventory—countless keywords and user 
segments—creates the foundation for price discrimination. The aim is to split the inventory 
into as granular pieces as possible and find the advertisers willing to pay the most for each. 
In the auction setting, this is very efficient as, at least in principle, each impression is 
auctioned individually. Furthermore, the types of auctions used are typically good for 
setting the prices. For example, as explained in section 2.1.3, the dominant strategy in VCG 
auctions for the advertisers is to simply bid their true value—although the auction dynamics 
prevent the platforms from charging that full value. While GFP and GSP auctions are not 
incentive compatible, revenue-wise they are quite close to VCG from the platform’s 
perspective.  
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In a direct sales setting, the platforms sell impressions in larger sets, and thus, the inventory 
is more uniform. Instead of offering a fixed price for everyone, the platforms typically 
negotiate deals one-to-one, i.e., advertisers won’t know how much others have paid. While 
this allows some price discrimination, it’s not as effective as in an auction. 
4.2.5! Competition for off-premise impressions 
Many ad platforms are buying impressions—either as an addition to their on-premise 
impressions or as their only source of inventory—from ad exchanges, ad networks or 
directly from publishers and reselling them. To keep this activity profitable, they have to 
add value somehow so that they can charge more than they pay for the impressions. Some 
of the added value can originate from aggregating multiple sources of supply—i.e., what 
demand-side platforms (DSP) do—or various services in the programmatic value chain (see 
section 1.1.2). 
The most effective way of adding value is making the impression itself more valuable. The 
value of showing an ad to an unknown person on a not-so-widely-known publisher’s website 
in negligible but an ad platform with data about the user can add value significantly by 
helping to identify individuals with purchase intent and showing them relevant ads. That 
said, other ad platforms can have their data about the user, and the price of an impression 
is determined by how much the competition is willing to pay for it (as explained in section 
4.1). Consequently, the profit margin a platform makes from reselling an impression results 
from the differences in the effectiveness of ad serving, tracking and attribution it has over 
others.  
For example, in 2016, for the impressions served outside its properties, Google paid on 
average a traffic acquisition cost (TAC) of 69.9% (Alphabet, 2017). That means that it was 
able to add on average 43% value on impressions with its ad serving, targeting and buying 
solutions. 
For the impressions served on the ad platforms’ own properties—i.e., when the publisher 
runs its own ad platform—there’s no traffic acquisition cost. This kind of vertical 
integration can be profitable in certain circumstances, as explained next in section 4.3. 
4.3! The case for a closed ad platform 
Table 11 summarizes the main differences between closed and open ad platforms. If a 
publisher reaches the critical scale required to build its own ad serving infrastructure and 
get advertisers directly on board, it may opt for becoming a closed ad platform.  
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Table 11. The differences of closed and open ad platforms. 
 Closed ad platform Open ad platform 
The publisher’s role The publisher sells the ad 
inventory on its site directly to 
advertisers. 
The publisher lets a third party sell 
the ad inventory. 
User tracking Only the publisher tracks users on 
its properties. 
The publisher lets third parties 
track the users on its property. 
Ownership of targeting data The publisher owns all data used 
for targeting. Advertisers don’t 
have direct access to it. 
Advertisers can provide their 
business and user data to the 
publisher. 
The platform and advertisers use 
their data without giving it to the 
publisher. 
User identification methods Login, browser cookies, device 
identifiers 
Browser cookies, device identifiers 
Ad formats Publisher defines Standardized across exchanges 
 
4.3.1! Sources of competitiveness 
Becoming a closed ad platform can be a good strategic move for a publisher: instead of 
allowing third parties to collect data from its users—a side effect from programmatic ad 
buying—and monetize it, closed platforms retain exclusive control to the ad infrastructure 
from selling to serving themselves. 
However, looking at the components of ad platform’s revenue (section 4.2), a publisher 
benefits from the move only if its conversion rates and the measured value of conversions 
are high enough to warrant a higher impression price than what the third-party ad 
platforms would be willing to pay for advertising to the user base. In other words, letting 
third parties serve ads on its site, a publisher can still get the market rate reflecting the value 
of its users to advertisers. 
For example, Facebook ran its ad exchange, Facebook Exchange (FBX), on the side of its 
closed advertising platform from 2012 to 2016 (Constine, 2012; Ha, 2016)—purportedly to 
address their post-IPO short-term revenue pressures. FBX allowed third parties use their 
data instead of the limited targeting options Facebook had back then, resulting in superior 
performance and increased ad investment in specific cases. 
Still, closed platforms have multiple advantages over that. First, they can leverage rich user 
data collected from their service for improved efficiency in ad serving. The platforms with a 
significant proportion of logged-in users have an advantage over this. For example, 
Facebook has a massive database of detailed demographic data—mostly self-reported by its 
users—whereas many targeting data providers in programmatic ad buying sometimes 
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struggle knowing even the gender of the user. The more information an ad platform has per 
user, the better it can target ads and the higher the price per impression it can charge. 
Second, as explained in section 4.2.3, closed ad platforms with logged-in users are 
sometimes in a better position to track them for measuring the effectiveness of ads. For 
example, instead of relying on short-lived and device-specific browser cookies, Facebook 
can track touchpoints from the same user across multiple devices and thus more effectively 
prove the value of advertising on the platform. 
Third, closed ad platforms are vertically integrated, capturing the whole value chain (see 
Figure 3, p. 11; Table 7, p. 28) instead of only the publisher’s slice of revenue—on average, 
45% (Interactive Advertising Bureau [IAB], 2015)—while avoiding the externalities 
imposed by double marginalization. Owning the whole value chain also enables increased 
efficiency from the significantly smaller number of intermediaries, providing opportunities 
for cost savings and drastically decreasing site loading times, considerably improving the 
user experience. 
Fourth, closed ad platforms can better control the user experience of people seeing the ads 
compared to publishers selling their ad inventory through an exchange. For example, 
Facebook and Google have their custom policies for eligible ads and weight bids in ad 
auction based on the estimated impact on user experience. Publishers using open ad 
platforms have a limited say over what gets served on their properties. Controlling user 
experience can improve user engagement and retention, consequently having a positive 
long-term impact on revenue. 
Fifth, the closed ad platforms can collect extremely valuable data from the advertisers 
themselves in an unparalleled way and use it to power their ad delivery. More on this in the 
next sections. 
4.3.2! Collecting user data from advertisers 
The data a closed platform can collect from its users is not limited to behavior within its 
properties: many of them provide advertisers various ways to supply their data which is then 
matched to the users of the platform. The advertisers benefit from using their first-party 
data in the form of better returns on their ad spend through improved ad serving efficiency. 
The improved advertiser performance consequently benefits also the platforms through 
increased overall prices of ad impressions. 
But more importantly, the platforms use all of this data to enrich their user profiles. In 
practice, advertisers often have to allow the platforms to record all the relevant user 
interactions on their site or in their app. This is in sharp contrast to buying ads through an 
open ad exchange in which the advertisers can choose what data to use from their data 
management platform (DMP). 
This can be used to build more detailed and reliable targeting options and improve the 
platform’s automatic optimization algorithms—both increasing the overall effectiveness of 
ad serving on the platform. Effectively, this means that the platforms are collecting data 
from advertisers and profiting from allowing other advertisers—sometimes competitors—
tap into its power. 
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The effect of gathering off-site data can be significant. For example, knowing that someone 
browsed a certain product category on multiple websites is a very strong commercial signal. 
In contrast, within many publisher platforms, the on-site user behavior either has very little 
commercial intent or is in a form that makes it very hard to collect and analyze it 
automatically. E.g., in the case of social platforms such as Facebook, having a detailed view 
of a social network has only limited commercial value and analyzing commercial cues from 
messages with electronic natural language processing is difficult due to informality, irony 
and sarcasm. 
On the other hand, inherently commercial platforms—such as the visual discovery platform 
Pinterest—or platforms at the end of a consumer purchase process—such as search 
engines—can gather a larger share of their user data within their platform and the effect of 
data collection from advertisers is subtler. 
4.3.3! Collecting business data from advertisers 
The primary ad delivery optimization is relatively simple: finding common patterns 
between users and delivering ads to people similar to the ones the message resonates with. 
This doesn’t necessarily require the algorithms to be aware of what’s advertised to the user. 
That’s not an issue for advertisers with only one or few messages they want to convey. For 
example, mobile game studios have been widely successful in digital advertising as they can 
find out in a data-driven way what kind of users are the most profitable and what kind of 
message is the most effective for them. 
But retailers, e-commerce, travel agencies and other businesses with thousands or millions 
of products or other offerings face the difficulty of finding the right products that draw each 
user’s attention and lead to a purchase. When retargeting people who have already visited 
the advertiser’s website or application, the browsing behavior can be used to infer what 
should be advertised to that person. This just has to be operationalized with the platform. 
But when acquiring new customers, it’s more difficult: the advertiser’s business data has to 
be merged with the platform’s user data. 
To address both of these needs, some platforms such as Google and Facebook offer the 
possibility for advertisers to upload their product and other business information in a 
machine-readable format to the platforms. This allows the platforms to understand not just 
what websites users visit but what types of products, services and content they interact with. 
This is used to determine what’s the product that should be shown to a user in an ad. 
The platforms typically have separate solutions for each industry and thus can compare the 
business data and match products across advertisers. This allows them to interpret 
commercial interactions better to be used across advertisers. For example, Facebook’s 
Dynamic Ads product has separate solutions for e-commerce, retail, travel, automotive and 
real estate that can be used to build comprehensive buyer profiles which are, in turn, used 
to generate product recommendations across advertisers. 
Again, this can be controversial from the advertisers’ perspective. For example, a closed ad 
platform can learn from a travel agency’s website that a user is considering a trip to a 
certain destination. This can be used to show another travel agency’s ad of the same 
destination to the same user. 
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4.3.4! Risks to advertisers 
Why are advertisers willing to share data with closed platforms if they know it’s being used 
to benefit other advertisers? First of all, it’s rather hard for an advertiser to quantify the 
impact data sharing has on its business and thus it can be underestimated. 
But it can also be argued that the benefits are higher than the costs. Especially small 
businesses contribute a relatively small amount of the total data in the user profiles but can 
leverage it all in the form of more extensive targeting options and better optimization of its 
ad delivery. Engaging in this kind of controlled mutual data sharing might make all the 
parties better off. This is the case especially with complementary businesses not directly 
competing with each other: airlines and hotel chains; diapers and strollers; bicycles and 
helmets. 
Not all businesses might be equally well off from this arrangement, though. Large 
enterprises are concerned about the disproportionally large amount of data they contribute 
that their competitors might effectively use to capture traffic to their site by advertising the 
same products at a lower price. 
The ad platforms can also use the business data to make an increasingly large share of the 
customer decision process happen in their service, making it harder for resellers, 
aggregators and agencies to compete with qualities other than price. For example, Google 
Shopping allows advertisers to feature their products in Google’s search results—however, 
multiple advertisers and their respective prices are displayed next to a generic product 
image. The comparison happens on Google’s platform, and the user is directed to the 
advertiser’s site only for the transaction. Similarly, online travel agencies pay to get their 
hotels and flights featured in Google’s search results while having to give up a large part of 
the customer experience and ways of differentiating. 
The consumers see this as increased efficiency, and it’s putting pressure on aggregators 
between the suppliers and the advertising channels. As mentioned by Eisenman et al. 
(2008), absorbing complements helps reducing the double marginalization caused by 
multiple layers of businesses. It remains to be seen if this is enough to drive some of the 
aggregators out of the market and if, consequently, the ad platforms can start charging 
disproportionate margins. 
In addition to having to share data with the ad platforms, advertisers have limited options 
for pulling data from the closed platforms. They don’t directly have access to the user data 
which makes it harder to orchestrate campaigns among multiple channels. Advertisers call 
these platforms often “black boxes” as there’s no way to see what’s happening inside them 
while it’s still possible to verify that the ads are effective. 
For the above reasons, there has been some pushback from advertisers against closed ad 
platforms, but it could be argued that Google and Facebook have simply just reached such 
a large scale that they can continue to exploit the position they’re in. Some of the 
advertisers interviewed for this study described closed ad platforms even as a threat to their 
businesses in the long term but they “can’t afford not advertising on them” as large shares 
of their traffic or user growth depend on them. Some other advertisers interviewed refuse to 
give Google and Facebook access to all of their data for the same reason, even if it would 
make their campaigns perform better in the short-term. 
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4.4! A comparison of Google and Facebook 
The most significant difference between Google and Facebook as ad platforms is their 
primary source of revenue. Google sells mostly search ads, helping people to find what 
they’re already looking for. Facebook sells display ads, targeting people with content they 
didn’t know they should be looking for. While the same revenue drivers (section 4.2) apply 
for both, this difference has an impact on the way each platform approaches improving 
their effectiveness of ad serving—one of the five drivers. 
Facebook has been able to improve its advertisers’ results first with detailed targeting 
options and later on with automatic optimization of ad delivery to users similar to those 
who have already converted. Both of these rely on building comprehensive profiles of the 
platform’s users.  
Google, on the other hand, hasn’t been so user-centric. In search advertising, it’s more 
important to support advertisers finding the right keywords bringing them the desired 
results. This also applies to its display and YouTube video ads: both are contextually 
targeted based on keywords and searches on those sites. 
Google also collects and leverages user data to some extent, but the nature of many of its 
services is not so good at enforcing users to log in and provide data about themselves. In 
comparison, Facebook requires all of its users to log in and encourages them to share 
information about themselves. 
Both of the platforms are moving to more closed ad products that—while being simple to 
use and provide good results—are mostly opaque to advertisers, letting them extract fewer 
insights from their advertising campaigns. Both platforms have also started to allow 
advertisers to provide their business data to improve results: on Google, to optimize the 
right content to be shown with the right keywords; and on Facebook, to optimize the right 
content to be shown to the right user. 
Many of the advertisers interviewed perceived Google’s rate of innovation in ad products 
slower than Facebook’s. Part of that might be attributed to the different types of advertising 
they support, part of that might be related to how they run their businesses.  
While on Facebook, most advertisers are using automatic bidding to allow the platform to 
optimize the bid for each user, many Google advertisers optimize their keyword-level bids 
manually and still get better performance that way. An advertiser might manage millions of 
keywords while on Facebook, the same advertiser might use only a few hundred audiences. 
Nevertheless, both the platforms have been able to provide results for advertisers and to 
improve them over time steadily. Both of them have also built hugely successful products 
for consumers and stayed competitive on that front—arguably their main business despite 
their revenues coming from the other side of the platform. 
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5! Discussion 
5.1! Strategic implications 
5.1.1! For publishers 
A publisher growing its active user base faces the question of whether to sell its ad inventory 
for a third party or to set up its own closed ad platform. This thesis provides them with a 
framework for splitting the decision into its five main drivers (section 4.2) and assessing the 
effect on each of them individually. And if they end up embarking on such an endeavor, the 
five drivers help them to concentrate on the activities yielding them the most incremental 
revenue. 
Some of the publishers might set up their closed ad platforms to better protect the users’ 
data and privacy or provide them a better experience using the service—both helping to 
grow the active user base. But for most publishers, the decision depends on the quality of 
data they can collect from their users and the resulting performance they can provide for 
their advertisers—as that’s a direct component of the ad platform revenue. 
Establishing the required infrastructure to leverage the collected data and serve the ads 
requires significant investments and can’t be done by any small-scale publisher. However, 
once a publisher has established the closed ad platform, it can find various ways to leverage 
its position to collect even more data it previously didn’t have access to. Google and 
Facebook are good examples of this. 
But would Google and Facebook have been as successful if they would have chosen to open 
their ad inventory for third-party ad platforms insyead? They both have had tremendous 
success with their consumer-facing products which can be argued to be a prerequisite for 
their revenue growth. The platforms could have been able to monetize their service through 
open ad platforms, but the impression prices might not have been as high as they’re now. 
Furthermore, building the infrastructure for collecting user information and optimizing the 
ads might have had positive side effects on improving the service based on data-driven 
insights. 
However, being able to charge higher impression prices from the advertisers than these now 
well-established mega ad platforms can pay is becoming increasingly difficult due to their 
dominance. Thus, publishers should focus on where their sustainable competitive 
advantage comes from. If their uniqueness lies in simply producing high-quality content, 
they should probably concentrate on that. If their strength is in optimizing user experience 
in a data-driven way, they might have a chance at building an ad platform. 
Even if a publisher decides to sell its ad inventory for third parties, the ruthless competition 
between the ad platforms ensures the publishers’ impression prices increase as well. 
Technologies such as header-bidding help them to pick the ad platforms yielding them the 
most revenue. 
5.1.2! For open ad platforms 
Open ad platforms’ primary source of competitiveness is typically the effectiveness of their 
ad serving. While this can be improved with better statistical modeling to some extent, what 
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matters in the end, is the sheer amount of data. The more publisher sites they operate on, 
the more comprehensive profile they can build from each user, and the better they can 
optimize the ads. Consequently, scaling up as an ad platform improves simultaneously two 
of the five drivers of ad platform revenue (section 4.2): active user base and effectiveness of 
ad serving. This is a sign that the currently still relatively fragmented industry needs to 
consolidate to remain competitive. 
Collecting data from users and measuring the results of advertising is becoming increasingly 
difficult for open ad platforms due to people using more devices, tracking-prevention 
software and tightening data regulation. Also, it’s rather restricted to the online world. To 
stay competitive against closed ad platforms, they have to innovate on ways to collect 
data—potentially through partnerships or mergers with possessors of that data. The more 
detailed answers for how to do that in practice are out of the scope of this thesis, though. 
5.1.3! For closed ad platforms 
While it’s vital for a closed ad platform to ensure its user-facing service stays competitive, 
maximizing net ad revenue can help providing some of the necessary capital to do that. 
This thesis provides them with a framework divided into five drivers (section 4.2) that helps 
them to understand which of their activities are contributing to generating incremental ad 
revenue and how those can be improved. 
The three drivers identified in this thesis as the ones where the platforms can gain the most 
edge against their competitors are access to an active user base, the effectiveness of ad 
serving, and the comprehensiveness of measurement. 
The smaller closed ad platforms with limited user penetration should concentrate on scaling 
up their user base as that, while linearly growing the platform’s ad revenue, also increases 
their competitiveness against other similar services. This is true especially for ad platforms 
operating in industries with winner-take-all dynamics or the risk of being enveloped by 
another platform. That’s also how Google and Facebook grew their businesses before their 
dominance. 
For the mega ad platforms Google and Facebook to maintain their growth, product 
innovations are in a significant role. The giants are starting to reach the limits of expanding 
their user base due to the lack of potential new users. While more and more people have 
online access, the vast majority of new internet users are from the least developed countries 
(LDC) and developing countries, consequently being less profitable for them (International 
Telecommunications Union, n.d.). 
The remaining growth avenues for the mega ad platforms are 
1.! increasing user exposure to the platform (more impressions per user) and 
2.! improving the efficiency of ad serving and measurement (more valuable 
impressions). 
Serving more impressions per user can be achieved with products that provide more utility 
and are increasingly engaging, consequently occupying a larger share of the user’s day. But 
that has its limits as well. In 2016, Facebook users globally already spent on average more 
than 50 minutes per day using the platform’s applications (Constine, 2016). 
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In contrast, there are still many ways to increase the impression prices. The vast majority of 
online ads users see are irrelevant. By improving the efficiency of ad serving, platforms can 
reduce that waste. By enhancing tracking and attribution technology, ad platforms can 
prove the value of their ads and get new verticals adopt them, consequently increasing the 
demand and prices. 
Both ad delivery optimization and measurement can be improved by ensuring all the 
necessary systems are in place for collecting user data—not just from the service itself but 
also from the advertisers. Besides, the platforms can build industry-specific ad products to 
collect structured business data from the advertisers and provide superior results. The 
closed platforms should have a strategy for tracking users across multiple devices and in the 
offline world. 
There also remain significant opportunities to innovate in new creative formats. The way 
consumers shop and discover new products is actively shifting from physical locations to the 
digital storefront. For example, the efficiency of ad serving can be improved by enabling 
brands to use augmented and virtual reality to build engaging and emotionally appealing 
experiences to make it easier for users to visualize the benefits of the advertised product or 
service. And as an increasing share of people’s social activities takes place digitally, social 
platforms such as Facebook are in an excellent position to leverage it to build more social 
ad experiences. 
5.1.4! For advertisers 
This thesis provides a simple model for advertisers to guide their budgeting decisions 
(section 4.1.1) and explains why in online advertising the focus should be on measuring and 
optimizing the results instead of concentrating too much on the reach or ad impressions 
served. 
When setting their budgets, advertisers should consider the method outlined in section 
4.1.1: finding the point where the marginal cost of conversions reaches the value of 
conversions—ideally measured as lifetime value. It’s common for advertisers to measure 
average (instead of marginal) cost of results and they might not acknowledge that some of 
the results are much more expensive than the average. 
Advertisers should be aware of the long-ranging effects their choice of attribution model can 
have. If the model in use doesn’t reflect how the ads yield incremental conversions, it most 
likely leads to wrong budgets being allocated to the wrong advertising channels and 
showing wrong creatives to the wrong users. It can even lead to suboptimal organizational 
dynamics as the performance of individuals and teams is often assessed based on the 
attribution model. Ideally, advertisers should test incrementality with randomized 
controlled trials and adjust the attribution models based on the results. 
Also, as online advertising provides superior measurement data on how people react to ads, 
advertisers should leverage that when developing their creatives: partly by utilizing various 
creative optimization tools the platforms offer and partly by incorporating a data feedback 
loop from their campaigns to their creative process. 
Advertisers should also pay attention to the data the ad platforms collect and how they’re 
using it. Sometimes—especially for larger companies—sacrificing campaign performance to 
prevent their data from being used to benefit the competition might be justified. It’s often 
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possible to refrain from sharing some parts of the data or even obfuscate it in a format that 
can’t be used to benefit others. 
Online advertising has become a significant source for user acquisition, especially for many 
online businesses. Some companies have been even built around online advertising with 
most of their sales originating from ads. This is a risky strategy for companies not investing 
in building their brand or owning the experiences that keep the users coming back—they 
have to win the user again for each new sale. This might not be profitable anymore as the 
competition for ad impressions increases and the more traditional industries with high 
customer lifetime values participate in it.  
5.2! Further research 
5.2.1! The effects of data privacy and regulation on online advertising 
One interesting and relevant consideration is assessing the potential effects various 
regulatory changes can have on the industry. The current legislation applied to ad 
platforms mostly predates the era of online advertising and they have been allowed to 
operate with relatively few restrictions. 
European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) became enforceable 
on May 25th, 2018, and while it applies only to individuals within the EU, most globally 
operating companies have made changes to all their operations to be compliant with it. The 
regulation sets rules on the processing of personally identifiable information (PII), expands 
data subjects’ rights and introduces substantial penalties for non-compliant companies 
(European Commission, n.d.). 
As a result of GDPR, companies are allowed to collect only the appropriate user data 
specific to the service they’re providing—and only with the user’s consent. This can 
potentially hit publishers hard as it can prevent them from letting third-party ad platforms 
to collect data from the service’s users. In particular, publishers are prohibited from 
collecting any personal data from first-time visitors who haven’t registered and given their 
consent to data collection. 
While many publishers and ad platforms have been lagging behind in making their services 
GDPR-compliant, the regulation can impact their business models. Publishers might have 
to shift from their current model heavily relying on third-party data to a more first-party 
focused model or contextual targeting instead of personal profiling. On the other hand, 
closed ad platforms such as Google and Facebook will remain relatively untouched as 
they’re using first-party data to target ads on their premises. Especially search ads are 
mostly well off as the search queries are not regarded as personal data. 
But the data privacy trend is not limited to GDPR and regulations. People are becoming 
more aware of their privacy, and this is reflected, e.g., in interest towards more closed 
services and efforts on circumventing various tracking technologies. While the public and 
the media have directed part of their dissatisfaction directly towards the ad platforms, the 
most viable solution would be through regulation. 
The consequences of regulatory changes and predicting how they start to unfold are out of 
the scope of this thesis. However, understanding them would be extremely important for 
both businesses and legislators. It’s clear that many publishers and ad platforms have to 
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change their business models and lawmakers have to assess the impact on companies and 
users. 
5.2.2! Measurement 
Goldfarb (2013) identifies measurability as a major difference to offline advertising and 
explains its effect on online advertising literature at length. However, the paper doesn’t 
recognize good measurability as a fundamental economic factor of online advertising in the 
same way as targeting. I think it is. Online advertising is more performance-focused: 
advertisers are buying measured results instead of impressions. And as shown in section 4.2, 
tracking and attribution play a significant role in an ad platform’s net ad revenue. 
Goldfarb (2013) notes that “the literature that measures online ad effectiveness is thriving”. 
The examples he points out, however, are mostly studies showing that advertisers get results 
from their campaigns—which shouldn’t be a surprise. There exist, however, little literature 
on how advertisers should measure the effectiveness of ads. As selecting the right attribution 
model has such an impact on how the advertising budgets are spent, more research should 
be done on how to define and refine it based on tests. 
5.2.3! Branding 
This thesis takes mostly a performance-based view to online advertising and puts a lot of 
weight on measuring the results relevant to the advertisers’ business. While the effects of 
brand building activities are not as easily quantifiable, they can’t be denied. Some of the 
challenges are the long conversion times, moderately low impact of each individual ad and 
the low number of user interactions—such as clicks—with the ads. Nevertheless, many 
online advertisers allocate budgets also for branding campaigns. 
Those campaigns are typically measured and optimized based on proxy metrics such as 
clicks, video views or other engagement. Some of the more advanced measurement types, 
e.g., Facebook uses are questionnaires and measuring the time spent looking the ad to 
estimate the lift in ad recall. 
More research should be done on the effects of such campaigns on brand awareness and 
determining what the right metrics advertisers should use to measure and optimize these 
campaigns are. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of interviews with advertisers 
 
Advertiser Titles Duration Author present Recording 
E-commerce 1 Marketing Manager 30 min Yes No 
E-commerce 2 Director / Head of 
Department, Marketing 
Technology Manager 
30 min Yes No 
E-commerce 2 Director / Head of 
Department 
45 min Yes No 
E-commerce 3 Director / Head of 
Department 
30 min Yes No 
E-commerce 3 Director / Head of 
Department, Marketing 
Technology Manager, 
Marketing Team Lead 
60 min Yes Yes 
E-commerce 4 Director / Head of 
Department 
45 min Yes Yes 
E-commerce 5 2x Director / Head of 
Department, Marketing 
Team Lead, Marketing 
Manager 
60 min Yes Yes 
E-commerce 6 Marketing Manager 30 min Yes No 
E-commerce 7 2x Director / Head of 
Department 
45 min Yes Yes 
E-commerce 8 Director / Head of 
Department 
30 min Yes Yes 
E-commerce 9 2x Director / Head of 
Department 
30 min No No 
E-commerce 10 Director / Head of 
Department 
60 min Yes No 
E-commerce 11 3x Marketing Manager 45 min No No 
E-commerce 12 2x Marketing Manager 60 min Yes Yes 
E-commerce 12 Director / Head of 
Department 
60 min Yes Yes 
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Financial services 1 Marketing Team Lead, 
Marketing Manager 
45 min Yes Yes 
Financial services 1 Marketing Team Lead, 
Marketing Manager 
45 min Yes No 
Gaming 1 Director / Head of 
Department 
30 min No No 
Gaming 1 Director / Head of 
Department 
30 min Yes No 
Gaming 2 Director / Head of 
Department 
45 min Yes Yes 
Group / Venture 
capital 1 
Marketing Manager 60 min Yes Yes 
Group / Venture 
capital 2 
2x Executive, Director 
/ Head of Department, 
Marketing Technology 
Manager 
60 min Yes No 
Group / Venture 
capital 3 
Director / Head of 
Department, Marketing 
Manager 
30 min Yes Yes 
Marketing agency 1 3x Marketing Manager 45 min Yes No 
Marketing agency 2 2x Director / Head of 
Department 
30 min Yes Yes 
Marketing agency 3 Director / Head of 
Department 
30 min Yes No 
Marketing agency 3 Director / Head of 
Department 
30 min Yes No 
Marketing agency 4 Marketing Manager 30 min Yes No 
Marketing agency 5 2x Marketing Manager 30 min Yes No 
Real estate 1 Marketing Technology 
Manager 
30 min Yes Yes 
Real estate 1 Marketing Manager 30 min Yes No 
Real estate 2 Marketing Team Lead  45 min Yes No 
Transportation 1 Marketing Technology 
Manager 
30 min Yes Yes 
Travel 1 Marketing Team Lead, 
2x Marketing Manager 
45 min Yes No 
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Travel 2 Marketing Technology 
Manager 
60 min No No 
Travel 2 Marketing Technology 
Manager, Marketing 
Manager 
60 min Yes No 
Travel 3 Marketing Manager 60 min Yes Yes 
Travel 4 Director / Head of 
Department 
45 min Yes Yes 
Travel 5 Marketing Team Lead, 
Marketing Manager 
30 min Yes Yes 
Travel 6 Director / Head of 
Department, Marketing 
Team Lead 
45 min Yes No 
Travel 7 Director / Head of 
Department, Marketing 
Manager 
30 min No No 
 
Appendix 2: List of other interviews 
 
Company Titles Duration Author present Recording 
Ad platform 1 Director / Head of 
department 
60 min Yes Yes 
Ad platform 1 Senior Consultant 30 min Yes Yes 
Ad platform 1 Director / Head of 
department 
30 min No No 
Ad platform 1 Director / Head of 
department 
60 min Yes No 
Technology partner 1 Account Manager 30 min No No 
Technology partner 2 Senior Consultant 45 min Yes No 
 
